




A DYNAMIC MODEL OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION FOR THE 








The  focus  of  this  research  is  to  learn  about  the  factors  that  influence  the  decision  of  a 
manufacturing firm to vertically integrate into the production of its input. The American 
paper industry has a feature that makes it particularly suitable for this purpose: over the years 
paper mills of apparently similar characteristics have made different decisions with regards to 
their integration status. This work draws on the insight that there must be some unobserved 
mill characteristic that drives the decision process for a mill.  Mills’ choices of whether to 
exit the industry, and with regards to their integration status when they choose to stay in 
operation, depend on their productivity. This generates selection and simultaneity biases in a 
reduced form estimation. In order to deal with these issues, I propose a dynamic model in the 
spirit of Olley and Pakes (1996). This approach not only takes care of the estimation biases, 
but also allows me to learn about the unobserved characteristics of the firms in my data, and 
to use them to determine which firms vertically integrate and which firms do not. In addition, 
the model I propose allows me to learn about how vertical integration affects productivity 
and mill’s entry and exit decisions. 
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Introduction and Summary 
 
The primary focus of this research is to learn about the factors that influence the decision of a 
manufacturing firm to vertically integrate into input production. In an attempt to shed some 
light on the empirically observable regularities and motives that shape a manufacturing firm's 
decision to internalize the production of its input, I propose a dynamic model á la Olley and 
Pakes (1996) that accounts for unobserved firm-specific characteristics and for entry and exit. 
This approach takes care of the estimation biases from selection and simultaneity that arise in 
a  reduced  form  model  framework,  and  allows  me  to  learn  about  the  unobserved 
characteristics of the firms in my data, and use them to determine who vertically integrates 
and who does not. Furthermore, the model I propose allows me to learn about how vertical 
integration affects productivity and firm’s entry and exit decisions. 
 
I use the U.S. pulp and paper industry in my research. I have collected data on individual 
mills for the years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995. The result is a panel dataset that allows 
me to track entry and exit, as well as integration status. Two features in particular make this 
industry suitable for my purposes. First, over the period 1975 to 1995 less than half of the 
operating paper mills in the U.S. were integrated backwards into pulp production. These mills 
accounted, however, for about 80% of the country's paper capacity. It seems a perfect setting 
to try to sort out the different reasons for a mill to vertically integrate. Second, the industry 
displays high rates of entry and exit over the period. While there were on average 550 active 
paper mills each year, only 361 of the 584 mills operating in 1975 survived to 1995. This 
behavior  of  the  mills  in  the  industry  raises  a  reasonable  concern  for  selection,  and  thus 
provides also an interesting setting to learn about the role of unobserved productivity and 
about the most convenient methodological approaches to deal with it in empirical estimation. 
 
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents my data and gives an overview 
of the American pulp and paper industry for the period 1975-1995. Chapter 3 presents a 
reduced form model of vertical integration for the paper industry and raises concerns about 
the possible estimation biases that may arise in a model that ignores the role of unobserved 
firm-specific productivity in a firm’s decision process. Chapter 4 presents a structural model 
of firm behavior that captures the choices facing a paper mill each period, with regards to 
both  its  operation  status  (in  or  out)  and  its  vertical  integration  status  (integrated  or 
disintegrated). Chapter 5 presents a simulation exercise to show how the structural model 
from  the  previous  chapter  allows  me  to  deal  with  the  endogeneity  and  selection  biases 
possibly present in a reduced form estimation framework. Chapter 6 describes in detail the 
steps required for the estimation of the structural model proposed, and presents some baseline 
results. Chapter 7 considers the possible directions in which this research may be extended. 





Data and Industry Background 
 
2.1 The papermaking process 
 
Paper is basically comprised of a mat of fibers. Since its invention, many different fibers 
have been used for its manufacture. These include the bast fibers of flax and mulberry, the 
stalks of bamboo and other grasses, various leaf fibers, cottonseed hair, wool, asbestos, 
and the woody fibers of trees. Cotton and linen rags, straw, and wastepaper have also been 
used. Today, however, wood is the primary raw material from which most paper pulp is 
made. 
 
Before wood can be made into paper, paperboard, and other products, it must be reduced 
to its basic components to form pulp. Wood is made up primarily of cellulose fibers 
bound together with lignin, a glue-like binder, plus sugars, gums, resins and mineral salts 
in lesser quantities. The objective of pulp manufacturing is to separate the wood into 
fibers and other components, remove the undesirable components, and provide a means 
for treating the fiber to produce a suitable pulp for the paper mill. Depending on the type 
of wood used, and the requirements of the end product, the conversion of wood into wood 
fibers is carried out by one (or a combination) of three general types of processes. The 
simplest pulping method is generally referred to as mechanical pulping. It differs from 
other pulping methods in that the reduction of pulp to fibers is essentially a physical 
operation in which the fibers are actually pulled away from each other by the application 
of some type of mechanical force. In chemical pulping processes, the chips are cooked in 
a chemical solution under pressure until the fibers are separated by dissolution of their 
lignin binder and fall apart with very little or no mechanical action. There are several 
chemical-pulping processes using one of several chemical solutions, depending on the 
type of wood used and the type of paper desired. The most known are the soda, sulfite, 
and sulfate processes. Finally, semi-chemical pulping processes combine mechanical and 
chemical  methods.  These  processes  were  developed  particularly  for  the  pulping  of 
hardwoods and have many variations.  
 
Pulp is made into paper in a paper mill. Paper mill layouts are generally divided into stock 
preparation, paper machine, and finishing operations. They vary somewhat based on the 
pulps used and grades of paper produced.  
 
Most pulp cannot be used for papermaking as it comes directly from the pulp mill. To 
obtain the final desired qualities, pulp having different characteristics may be blended in, 
and dyes and special additives are also included to achieve the specific color and physical 
properties of the sheet. These operations are usually referred to as stock proportioning or 
stock blending. To impart mechanical strength to the final sheet, the pulp is then refined 
in a variety of machines, typical of which are the refiners, jordans, and beaters. Basically, 
this operation consists of passing the pulp repeatedly between sharp moving bars that cut Chapter 2: Data and Industry Background   4 
 
 
and abrade the fibers. Before going to the paper machine the pulp is screened and, in some 
cases, cleaned by passing through centrifugal-type cleaners. 
 
Paper machine operations can be subdivided into wet and dry end. The most common 
major component of the wet end portion of the paper machine on which the paper is 
formed is a foudrinier, consisting mainly of a continuous fine screen, called a wire, on 
which the pulp suspension is spread. Most of the water drains at the top of the wire to 
form a mat of fibers. A series of vacuum suction boxes draw more water from the mat, 
and the wet paper leaves the foudrinier machine at a consistency of about 20% fiber and 
additives, 80% water. The wet paper is sent to the presses where it is supported by endless 
woven or synthetic loops called felts, and passed between heavy press rolls that press out 
as much water as possible. The rest of the water is then evaporated on steam-heated rolls. 
 
Most dried papers go through one or more additional finishing processes, one of which is 
calendering.  This  process  consists  of  ironing  the  paper  between  heavy  polished  steel 
rollers to give it a much smoother surface. Some paper is wound in large rolls as it comes 
from the calenders, to be later rewound and cut into smaller rolls or sheets as required by 
the user. And some papers are produced specifically for further processing by converter-
plants that make consumer products.  
 
The  different  paper  products  may  be  classified  using  six  broad  paper  categories:  (1) 
newsprint and other papers produced from groundwood pulp; (2) book and writing papers; 
(3) wrapping papers; (4) paperboard; (5) sanitary papers; and (6) industrial papers. 
 
 
2.2 The U.S. pulp and paper industry, 1975-1995 
 
Data was collected for five cross-sections at five-year intervals, starting in1975, from the 
Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Pulp, Paper and Allied Trades.
1 For all the active mills 
in the U.S. for which pulp and paper production capacity was reported,
2 information on 
owner, location, capacities, and paper grades produced each year was recorded. Mills 
were coded according to their owner and location in order to be able to track them over 
time.  Table  2.1  presents  some  summary  statistics.  It  shows  a  growing  industry  that 
displays a tendency towards larger and fewer mills over the years.  
 
The mill level data on pulp and paper production capacities were used to determine its 
degree of vertical integration. For each mill, the pulp to paper ratio was computed, and the 
mill was denoted as vertically integrated whenever this ratio was different from zero. In 
addition, the fact that roughly 30% of the firms in the industry own more than one mill 
suggested that a definition of vertical integration accounting only for production of both 
pulp and paper at the same location was too restrictive. Conversations with people in the 
                                                           
1   Formerly  known  as  the  "Post's  Pulp  and  Paper  Directory",  it  changed  its  name  after  a  merger  with  the 
"Lockwood 's Directory of the Paper and Allied Trades" in 1987. 
 
2   Capacity reported was for 605 out of 755 mills in 1975, 620 out of 738 in 1980, 589 out of 671 in 1985, 536 
out of 629 in 1990, and 539 out of 638 in 1995. Chapter 2: Data and Industry Background   5 
 
 
trade  revealed  that  a  firm  is  likely  to  use  the  pulp  produced  at  one  location  for  the 
production of paper at another as long as the two locations are not too far apart. This lead 
to the conclusion that, for mills belonging to multi-plant firms, the distance between the 
individual locations needed to be incorporated into the definition of vertical integration. 
According to industry sources, the largest distance between a paper and a pulp mill that 
allows for cost-efficient transportation of the pulp to the paper mill lies between 350 to 
400  miles.  With  this  consideration  in  mind,  the  distance  between  integrated  and 
specialized paper mills, as well as the distance between pulp mills and specialized paper 
mills owned by the same firm, was measured. Whenever such distance fell within the cost 
efficient range, production capacities were considered in order to determine whether the 
paper mill should be considered integrated. 
 
 
2.2.1   Integration Patterns 
 
Tables 2.2 through 2.6 show different aspects of vertical integration in the paper industry. 
From table 2.2 we see that while most of the pulp-producing mills are vertically integrated 
into paper  production, this is not true for  paper  mills.  In 1980 mills reporting in-site 
production of both pulp and paper accounted for 47% of all paper producing mills. The 
proportion is lower for all other years in the sample. Interestingly, however, roughly 80% 
of total paper capacity in the U.S. each year belongs to mills reporting capacities for both 
pulp and paper production.  
 
Table 2.2 also reports the number of integrated mills that obtains when paper mills using 
pulp from a close-by mill belonging to the same owner are accounted for. We see that 
paper mills with in-site pulp  production represent between  an 86%  and a 92%  of all 
integrated mills over the years. 
 
Table 2.3 looks at the proportion of vertically integrated paper mills in the U.S. by region. 
The distribution of integrated mills appears rather unequal when looked at in this manner, 
with a significantly higher proportion  of integrated mills in the southern and western 
regions, where  most  of  the  forestland  in  the U.S.  is  found,  and  a  significantly  lower 
proportion in the Northeast. 
 
Table 2.4 presents the distribution of integrated paper mills according to their pulp to 
paper capacities ratio. Two issues are noteworthy here. First, even though throughout the 
sample period, integrated firms with pulp to paper ratios greater than or equal to 1 are 
almost always in majority
3, over the years the proportion of firms in this range fell from 
61% of all integrated mills in 1975 to 45% in 1995. At the same time, the proportion of 
firms  in  the  two  lower  ranges  was  rising,  particularly  in  the  middle  range  of  ratios 
between 0.5 and 1. This shows an increasing tendency of the vertically integrated firms to 
be self-sufficient, but not participate as sellers in the market-pulp market. Second, both 
the  mean  and  the  standard  deviation  of  the  pulp  to  paper  ratios  fell  over  the  years. 
                                                           
3   The exception is year 1990 for which the 0.5 to 1 range displays the higher proportion. 
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However, while the mean fell by only 8% from 1975 to 1995, the standard deviation did 
so by 35%. Very low and very high levels of vertical integration, as measured by this 
ratio, must have been found to be inefficient over the years. 
  
Table 2.5 compares integrated versus nonintegrated paper mills over the sample years. We 
see that mills that produce newsprint paper have been mostly integrated. In contrast very 
few of the firms that produce industrial paper grades are vertically integrated. These two 
findings  agree  with  the  predictions  of  the  transaction-costs  model:  it  is  the  more 
standardized  paper grades that should be  produced by  vertically integrated productive 
units. We also find that the proportion of integrated mills belonging to multi-plant firms is 
higher than the proportion of specialized paper mills, and that integrated mills are more 
likely to produce more than one paper type than nonintegrated mills. 
 
Table 2.6 presents the distribution of paper capacity by relative size of mill capacity, 
distinguishing integrated and nonintegrated mills. We see that the vertically integrated 
paper mills are generally larger than the nonintegrated. This table is also  intended to 
permit the exercise of applying the "survivor technique" developed by Stigler (1968) to 
find the optimal plant size of both integrated and nonintegrated mills
4 Market share has 
risen for the vertically integrated mills with production capacities above 0.5% and below 
0.75% of total paper capacity. It has also risen for those with capacities above 1% and 
below 1.5% of total capacity. For the nonintegrated paper mills there is no size category 
with an increasing market share over the years. Most nonintegrated mills, however, have 
paper capacities below 0.1% of total capacity. This size category holds a basically steady 
market share over the sample period. Also, table 2.6 shows declining market shares for 
the  nonintegrated  mills  with  sizes  smaller  than  0.5%  of  total  paper  capacity.  There 
appears to be a production scale at which vertical integration becomes efficient for a paper 
mill. The efficient mill size for vertical integration falls in the range above 0.5% of total 
paper capacity in the industry. 
 
 
2.2.2  Entry and Exit Patterns 
 
Table 2.7 presents the rates of entry and exit in the U.S. paper industry over the sample 
years. The sample is divided into four periods, and an entrant is defined as any mill whose 
code is not in the database in the starting year of the period. Similarly, an exiting mill is 
defined as one whose code is not in the database in the last year of the period. Although 
the total number of paper mills fell from 584 in 1975 to 508 in 1995, this result obtains 
after substantial simultaneous entry and exit of mills, the ending balance being determined 
to a great extent by the high amount of exit observed during the 1985-90 period. Table 2.7 
also shows that in each period, the share of exiting nonintegrated mills exceeded that of 
exiting integrated mills. It is also true, however, that for two out of the four periods in the 
                                                           
4   This method finds the efficient mill size by assuming that competition of different sizes of mills sifts out the 
more  efficient  enterprises.  Mills  are  classified  by  size  category  based  on  percentages  of  total  industry 
production (or capacity) and the market share originating from each category is observed over time. Efficient 
mill size will be revealed by a rising market share and inefficient size(s) by declining market shares over the 
period. Chapter 2: Data and Industry Background   7 
 
 
data  the  number  of  nonintegrated  paper  mills  entering  the  market  is  higher  than  the 
number of integrated mills. 
 
Table 2.8 compares integrated entrants and integrated established mills each period, at the 
national level and by region. Integrated mills constitute a decreasing share of all entrants 
to the industry. Nevertheless, they  account for a rather stable share of all established 
firms. At the regional level, the southern and western regions display higher proportions 
of integrated mills than the other regions, and this is true for both entrants and established 
firms.
5 During the 1990-95 period, however, the proportion of integrated entrants in the 
South is substantially below that of the earlier periods. 
 
Table  2.9  focuses  on  the  paper  mills  that  survived  the  whole  sample  period  without 
changing integration status. They amount in number to 290 mills. 65% of the vertically 
integrated  mills  that  were  active  in  1975  survived  to  1995,  while  only  40%  of  the 
nonintegrated paper mills did. So the survival rate was higher among the integrated mills 
each year, suggesting that integration was a profitable strategy contributing to enhance 
competitiveness.  
 
Table 2.10 shows the  mills that switched  between integration and specialization  each 
period.  These  constitute  a  minority  of  all  mills.  In  general,  a  mill  that  starts  out  as 
vertically integrated ends the sample period as such, and the same holds for nonintegrated 
firms.  The  switching  mills  reported  are  paper  mills  (they  switch  from  paper  only  to 
integration or from integration to paper only, but not into or out of paper production
6) and 
several of them appear as switching from one status to the other more than once during 
the sample. 
 
Finally, table 2.11 presents the Herfindahl indices for the regional pulp and paper markets. 
Regional differences are apparent for the pulp market, the South showing much higher 
concentration measures than the other regions. Concentration in the South, in addition, 
shows  an  increasing  trend  over  time.  The  western  region  has  the  second  highest 
concentration measure, although much less than the South, and displaying the opposite 
trend over the sample period. For the paper market we observe lower indices in general, 
with higher indices in the South than in the other three regions. It is worth noting that 
while there is considerable variation over time of the concentration measures for the pulp 
market, there is never as much for the paper market. 
 
                                                           
5   Only in the 1975-1980 period the proportion of integrated entrants in the Central region is higher than that of 
the West. 
 
6   In my sample only one pulp mill integrated forward into paper production and one integrated mill disintegrated 






Reduced Form Model of Vertical Integration 
 
3.1 Related Literature 
 
3.1.1 Incentives for Vertical Integration 
 
Central to the notion of vertical integration is the elimination of contractual exchanges and 
the  substitution  of  internal  exchanges  within  the  boundaries  of  the  firm.  Perry  (1989) 
classifies  the  incentives  for  vertical  integration  in  three  broad  categories:  technological 
economies,  transactional  economies,  and  market  imperfections.  Technological  economies 
occur if fewer resources are used to produce the downstream output upon vertical integration 
with the upstream process. Transactional economies refer to the reduction in transaction costs 
when  integration  replaces  external  exchange.  Finally,  "market  economies"  stem  from 
substituting integration for exchanges in imperfect markets: firms integrate to avoid costs 
attributed  to  monopoly  or  monopsony  market  power,  price  controls  and  rationing, 
externalities, imperfect or asymmetric information, and problems associated with uncertainty.  
 
The first two categories of determinants view vertical integration as welfare increasing. As a 
result,  transaction  cost  economics  is  primarily  concerned  with  explaining  and  predicting 
patterns  of  vertical  integration  (Teece  1976,  Levin  1991,  Levy  1985,  Spiller  1985).  In 
contrast, vertical integration that arises in response to market imperfections may increase or 
decrease welfare. So public policy questions become of central interest. When firms make the 
decision to  vertically integrate, it is likely that  more than  one  of these  categories apply. 
However,  it  is  hard to  identify  the  different  types  of  incentives  econometrically.  Market 
imperfections usually translate into costs of exchange, and since there are often other possible 




3.1.2 The Transaction Costs Model 
 
Like  production,  exchange  is  costly.  Vertical  integration  is  just  one  method  of  bilateral 
exchange.  Contractual  exchange  is  its  primary  alternative.  Transaction  cost  economics 
examines the relative costs of contractual versus internal exchange. Its leading proponent is 
Williamson (1975,1985).  
 
Bilateral  monopoly  between  a  buyer  and  a  seller  arises  because  gains  from  trade  are 
enhanced by investments in assets specialized to their exchange. This is what Williamson 
called "asset specificity". Asset specificity may arise from investments in specific physical 
capital, specific human capital, site-specific capital, dedicated capital, or brand name capital. 
These transaction specific assets are the source of what Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) Chapter 3: Reduced Form Model of Vertical Integration    9 
 
 
call "appropriable quasi-rents" - the difference between the value of the asset in its current 
use and its value in its next best use. In uncertain environments, it is usually prohibitively 
costly to write long-term contracts specifying all obligations under all contingencies. It is 
likely, then, that a situation arises in which one party engages in opportunistic behavior, and 
attempts to extract the quasi-rents of the other by threatening to dissolve the relationship 
unless price concessions are granted. Such opportunistic behavior involves costs of haggling, 
and may result in the failure to maximize joint profits. Provisions in the contracts that govern 
the  exchange  can  lessen  some  of  these  problems.  However,  when  asset  specificity  is 
substantial,  contractual  governance  over  opportunism  can  be  very  costly,  and  internal 
organization of the exchange through vertical integration may then be more efficient. 
 
Empirical assessments of the transaction-cost explanation for vertical integration have found 
that a number of transaction-cost indicators, such as industry concentration (an indicator of 
the  number  of  buyers  and/or  sellers  competing  in  the  market)  and  proxies  for  asset 
specificity, are positively associated with the extent of vertical integration in a given industry 
or firm. Spiller (1985) examines vertical mergers to test the theory. He estimates the gains 
from mergers using stock price information, and finds that they are negatively related to the 
distance  between  vertically  related  plants,  a  measure  of  transaction-specific  assets.  This 
provides some support for site specificity and vertical coordination as explanations of vertical 
mergers.  Globerman  and  Schwindt  (1986)  evaluate  the  significance  of  transactional 
determinants in explaining the observed patterns of vertical integration in the Canadian forest 
products sector. They document and explain the integration patterns of the 30 largest forest-
based  enterprises  using  the  transactions  cost  approach,  and  conclude  that  transactional 
considerations,  particularly  asset  specificity,  are  robust  empirical  determinants  of  the 
governance  structure.  Hennart  (1988)  explores  whether  Williamson's  theory  of  vertical 
integration holds for the upstream stages of the aluminum and tin industries. He concludes 
that the structure of these industries is broadly consistent with Williamson's predictions: the 
higher  degree  of  vertical  integration  in  aluminum  can  be  explained  by  greater  scale 
economies, higher barriers to entry, higher transportation costs, and greater asset specificity. 
Differences in vertical integration within the tin industry can be explained in terms of the 
same variables. Caves and Bradburd (1988) test the theoretical models of vertical integration 
on a cross-section of industries. They confirm the roles of contractual and transaction-cost 
factors such as small-numbers bargaining, lock-in effects, and the need for industries to share 
intangible assets. Finally, Ohanian (1993, 1994) tests a transaction-cost model of vertical 
integration of the U.S pulp and paper industry for the period 1900-1940. Using mill level 
data, she finds vertical integration of pulp and paper production to be positively associated 




3.2 The reduced-form model 
 
In order to assess the extent to which transaction-costs explain the choice of a paper mill to 
integrate backward into pulp production, the following model is estimated: 
 
VIi = a0 + a1SIZEi + a2NEWSi + a3SWi + a4CONCi + ei Chapter 3: Reduced Form Model of Vertical Integration   10 
 
 
VIi is a dummy variable denoting whether mill i is or is not vertically integrated. Recall that 
about 70% of the paper mills are themselves firms (i.e. are owned by a single-mill firm). Also 
recall that for the remaining 30% that belong to multi-plant firms, distance was incorporated 
into the definition of vertical integration in order to account for the possible integration that 
occurs between mills at different close-by locations when owned by the same firm. This 
implies  that  in  this  model  focusing  on  the  mill  as  the  relevant  decision-making  unit,  is 
equivalent to focusing on the firm. From now on both terms will be used interchangeably. As 
explained in Chapter 2, VIi takes a value of 1 whenever the computed pulp to paper ratio is 
different from zero, and a value of 0 otherwise. SIZEi is the log of the paper capacity of firm 
i, measured in tons per day. It is a proxy for firm size, because data such as firm sales or 
assets are not available for the full sample of firms listed in the directory. NEWSi is a dummy 
variable indicating the production of newsprint, a standardized paper grade, that is usually 
produced on a larger scale than other specialized finer grades of paper which are produced in 
smaller batches (to order), and requires a less complex mix of pulps than the finer grades. It 
is a proxy for asset specificity, because newsprint production requires the specialization of 
the  pulping  assets  to  conform  to  the  requirements  of  the  papermaker.  SWi  is  a  dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 whenever the firm is located in the South or West regions, 
where most of the forestland in the U.S. is found. It is a proxy for site specificity. Finally 
CONCi is a concentration measure of the market in which the mill operates, and it is used as a 
proxy for the potential for a small-numbers bargaining problem. A circular market with a 100 
miles radius was defined around each mill and two types of concentration measures were 
constructed.  The  first  one  is  a  Herfindahl-Hirshman  Index  for  the  market-pulp  market, 
calculated from the market-pulp capacities that result after accounting for the pulp capacity 
that is absorbed by the paper mills belonging to the same owner and operating in close-by 
locations
7. The pulp capacity share of each mill was excluded when building the index for the 
circular market in which it operates, so these concentration measures are mill-specific. The 
second measure used as a proxy for concentration is the pulp by mill ratio in each circular 
market.  
 
Firm size is expected to be positively associated with the decision to vertically integrate, 
because, all else equal, transaction-cost savings will be greater compared to those of a smaller 
firm. Temin (1988) observes that larger firms are more likely to assure a steady supply of 
inputs through integration because the costs of supply disruptions are greater for them. Larger 
firms are also more likely to integrate if economies of scale in the upstream process result in 
lower costs for their own production compared to small firms (Williamson 1985). Also, if the 
frequency  of  transactions  rises  with  firm  size,  a  greater  frequency  of  transactions  will 
increase the benefits to integrate and may justify the costs of reorganization (Williamson 
(1985)). The coefficients on the dummy variables are expected to be positive, since they 
proxy for different forms of asset specificity. Finally, concentration is also expected to be 
positively  associated  with  the  decision  to  vertically  integrate.  Generally,  market 
concentration indicates the number of alternative suppliers (or buyers) a firm may turn to in 
the event of opportunistic behavior by another party. A highly concentrated market structure 
                                                           
7 Market-pulp capacity is defined as the pulp capacity reported by mills  producing only pulp, plus the difference 
between the pulp and paper capacities reported by those integrated mills with a pulp to paper ratio higher than 1. Chapter 3: Reduced Form Model of Vertical Integration   11 
 
 
has  a  greater  potential  for  opportunistic  behavior  in  market  transactions  and,  hence, 
constitutes an incentive to vertically integrate. 
 
The  model  is  also  estimated  after  pooling  all the  data  years.  A  pooled regression  and  a 
random  effects  panel  regression  are  run  using  the  variables  described  above.  The  pulp 
production  of  the  100  miles  radius  circular  market  is  considered  as  an  alternative 
concentration  measure.  I  also  estimate  a  version of  the  panel  including  two  new  market 
characteristic variables. State-level income per capita is included as a measure of the size of 
the market in which the mill operates. I also include a measure of the proportion of ruralness 
of the state; I use the ratio of state-level non-metropolitan to metropolitan populations. 
 
Finally, a version of the model is estimated pooling all the data years and taking differences. 
In this reduced form specification I include both current and lagged concentration measures, 
and time trends to allow for the possibility that industry-level shocks at certain moments in 





The data set contains observations at five-year intervals between 1975 and 1995, for the U.S. 
paper mills that were active each year, and for which pulp and paper capacity was reported. 
Since there was entry and exit over the period, the number of mills is not constant across 
cross-sections. 
 
The discrete dependent variable model 
 
I begin by estimating the first model described in Section IV, including the same set of 
independent variables and a constant term for each cross-section, as well as for the pooled 
data. Estimation is done using alternative discrete dependent variable models to ensure that 
the  results  are  not  dependent  on  a  possibly  erroneous  assumption  about  the  underlying 
distribution. The linear probability model, the logit model, and the probit model produce 
similar answers. Estimation results for the probit model, as well as the corresponding partial 
derivatives, are presented in table 3.1.   
 
The coefficient on size is always positive as expected and highly significant, implying that 
there is indeed a bigger incentive for larger firms to become vertically integrated. This strong 
result, however, may also be signaling the possible endogeneity of size. It may be that there 
is  some  unobserved  firm  characteristic  causing  mills  to  be  both  large  and  vertically 
integrated. This possibility that mill size is endogenously determined needs to be addressed. 
 
The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating newsprint production, NEWSi, is always 
positive and highly significant for all years but 1975, when it is still positive but insignificant. 
1975 is also the year in the sample with proportionally fewer vertically integrated newsprint 
firms (see table 2.5). The coefficient on the dummy variable serving as a proxy for forestland, 
SWi, is positive and significant for all cross-sections, with the exception of 1995, when the Chapter 3: Reduced Form Model of Vertical Integration   12 
 
 
Herfindahl-Hirshman concentration measure is used (model I in table 3.1). It would seem that 
investment near forestland area lost its specific  asset condition for the later years in the 
sample. A possible explanation for this could be the growing tendency in the paper industry 
to substitute towards more environmentally friendly pulping processes that do not rely only 
on  the  availability  of  wood  pulp.  When  the  pulp-by-mill  concentration  measure  is  used 
(model II in table 3.1), this variable loses significance. It remains significant for the first two 
years in the sample, and the pattern of significance over time is not lost.  
 
The surprising result from this exercise is that when the Herfindahl-Hirshman concentration 
measure is used, the coefficient is always negative and significant. This result is in clear 
contradiction to the one obtained by Ohanian (1993,1994) for the earlier years of the paper 
industry. A possible explanation may be in the fact that during the first four decades of the 
century  the  paper  industry  in  the  U.S  was  going  through  a  relocation  process  from  the 
Northern and Central regions towards the South and West. Investments close to the primary 
input sources were apparently a strong incentive for start-up firms to exploit the benefits of 
vertical integration. At the same time, the number of firms in the South and West was not yet 
as large as in the later years. So the concentration measures were higher in the regions where 
firms were finding it more efficient to integrate backward into pulp production. Once the 
industry settled, the differences in market concentration across regions became smaller (see 
the regional Herfindahl indices in table 2.11). The number of vertically integrated paper mills 
in the South and West remained, however, proportionally higher than in the North or Center 
of the U.S. This result could be signaling once again the presence of endogeneity in the 
model. If the higher the number of vertically integrated mills in the market in response to 
some  unobserved  firm  characteristic,  the  higher  the  market  concentration,  then  market 
concentration  is  endogenously  determined.  The  correlation  of  the  unobserved  factors 
determining the vertical integration decision with those explaining the market’s concentration 
level would be causing my estimates to be biased and could be counteracting a true positive 
effect. 
 
The pulp-by-mill concentration measure yields a different result. The probit coefficient on 
this concentration proxy is slightly positive for all years in the sample and always strongly 
significant. The fact that an alternative concentration measure yields a result more in line 
with what is expected, contributes to strengthen the hypothesis that the negative result of the 
first  model  may  be  due  to  endogeneity  of  market  concentration  to  vertical  integration. 
Certainly this hypothesis needs to be further explored. 
 
Panel data analysis 
 
By pooling together all of the cross-sections I am able to build an unbalanced panel with 
2593 observations. I begin by estimating the probit model in which the dependent variable is 
the  vertical  integration  dummy,  as  a  conventional  panel  with  common  slope  parameters 
imposed across all firms. The same probit model is then estimated under the assumption of 
random coefficients. Estimation results are presented in table 3.2.  The random-effects probit 
returns larger coefficients and slightly lower t-statistics, but in general results in both cases 
are similar. Consistent with the predictions of the transaction-costs model, the coefficients 
obtained  for  the  firm  size  variable,  the  newsprint  production  dummy,  and  the  forestland Chapter 3: Reduced Form Model of Vertical Integration   13 
 
 
dummy are in both cases positive and strongly significant. As stated above, three alternative 
concentration measures are used, and included both in their current and lagged versions. The 
first two columns of table 3.2 show the results when the concentration measure employed is 
the  Herfindahl-Hirshman  Index.  As  before,  the  coefficient  on  the  current  period 
concentration index is negative and significant. However, interestingly, the coefficient on its 
lag is positive as expected, and strongly significant. This result says that mills respond with a 
lag to market concentration in terms of making decisions about their integration status. This 
is by no means a counter-intuitive result, since a decision to integrate requires investing in the 
purchase of pulp-processing machinery and equipment. This result obtains for all alternative 
proxies  of  market  concentration  used.  Concentration  measures  labeled  II  and  III  refer 
respectively  to  pulp-per-mill  and  total  pulp  in  the  100-miles  circular  market.  These  two 
proxies for concentration are likely to exhibit less endogeneity related to the decision of a 
mill to vertically integrate. The coefficients on the current period concentration are in these 
two cases small but positive, and strongly significant. 
  
The fixed-effects versions of these models were estimated switching to a logit specification 
and are available at request. Estimation in this case presents some inconveniences. First, the 
two explanatory dummy variables are lost. The forestland dummy is by definition invariant 
within each group since firms are coded over time according, among other features, to their 
location.  With  a  few  exceptions,  the  newsprint  production  dummy  does  not  vary  within 
groups either. Because it is unlikely that firms will decide to switch in or out of newsprint 
production given the specialized machinery and the scale of operations that production of this 
paper type requires, a good part of this variation can be attributed to measurement error. It 
thus seems convenient to drop this variable from the fixed-effects panel estimation. Second, 
fixed-effects estimation takes into account only those mills whose vertical integration status 
changed over the period. All other mills are automatically dropped during the estimation 
process and that takes us from a sample of 643 mills  (2593 observations) to one of 142 mills 
(612 observations). The estimation results from the fixed-effects version of this model need 
to be considered with caution. The explanatory variables included lose significance, probably 
for  the  reasons  presented  above,  and  the  fixed  effects  estimation  overall  contributes  no 
additional information to this research.  
 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the panel estimation using change data. The purpose of this 
exercise is to further explore the relationship between integration and market concentration, 
by trying to explain in which way market concentration affects the decision of a paper mill to 
change  integration  status.  For  this  purpose  both  a  change  in  concentration  and  a  lagged 
concentration measure are included as explanatory variables. The concentration measure used 
in this exercise was the Herfindahl-Hirshman index corrected, as described above, to exclude 
the mills’ own market share in the 100-miles-radius circular market in which I assume they 
participate. The data was split according to the direction of the change of integration status 
and in both cases (switch to integration and switch to disintegration) the mills that did not 
change status were included. The coefficients on the concentration variables have the correct 
sign in all cases, with the exception of that on the change in concentration variable in the 
pooled panel of the switchers who integrated. The fixed effects estimation corrects the sign 
but  renders  this  variable  insignificant.  However,  the  power  of  the  lagged  market 
concentration to explain why mills choose to integrate or disintegrate is confirmed by these Chapter 3: Reduced Form Model of Vertical Integration   14 
 
 
results. The coefficients on the year dummies are found to be strongly significant, signaling 





Paper  mills  choose  to  vertically  integrate  into  pulp  production  because  internalizing  the 
production  of  their  input  allows  them  to  avoid  the  transaction  costs  associated  with 
outsourcing.  The empirical exercises presented above contribute elements that confirm the 
role of asset and site specificity as conditions that render integration convenient from a cost-
side perspective.  In addition my results point towards cost benefits, arising from economies 
of scale, that make a large paper producer more likely to integrate than a small one. However, 
the  reduced-form  specification  of  the  model  does  not  properly  address  the  possible 
endogenous  relation  of  mill  size  and  vertical  integration  that  has  been  suggested  above. 
Similarly, although the panel analysis portion of this chapter contributes to clear the role of 
market concentration in explaining a paper mill’s decision to vertically integrate, the possible 
endogeneity of this relationship also needs to be explored further. 
 
In addition, the fact that we observe paper mills of similar sizes operating in close proximity, 
making different choices about integrating or not, makes one think that there must be some 
idiosyncratic  mill  specific  characteristics  driving  these  decisions,  that  is  not  adequately 









The primary focus of this research is to learn about the factors that influence the decision of a 
manufacturing firm to vertically integrate into the production of its input.  The reduced form 
econometric approach presented in the previous section sheds some light on the empirically 
observable regularities and motives that shape a paper mill's integration decision. My results, 
however, appear to suffer from an endogeneity bias. The reduced form exercise also provides 
no  answer  to  the  fact  that  mills  of  similar  characteristics  make  different  decisions  with 
regards to their integration status. The insight is that there must be some unobserved mill 
characteristic that drives the mill in its decision process.  
 
In order to deal with these issues, I propose a dynamic model á la Olley and Pakes (1996) 
that  accounts  for  unobserved  plant-specific  characteristics  and  for  entry  and  exit.  This 
approach takes care of the estimation biases that are a concern from previous work, and 
allows me to learn about the unobserved characteristics of the firms in my data, and use them 
to determine who vertically integrates and who does not. In addition, the model I propose 
allows me to learn about how vertical integration affects productivity and mill’s entry and 
exit decisions. 
 
Two features make the U.S. paper industry particularly suitable for my purposes. First, over 
the period 1975 to 1995 less than half of the operating paper mills in the U.S. were integrated 
backwards  into  pulp  production.  These  mills  accounted,  however,  for  about  80%  of  the 
country's paper capacity each year. It is, thus, a perfect setting to try to sort out the different 
motives for a firm to vertically integrate. Second, the industry displays very high rates of 
entry and exit over the period. While there were on average 550 active paper mills each year, 
only 290 of the 584 mills operating in 1975 survived to 1995. 
 
 
4.2 Related Literature 
 
4.2.1 Dynamic Models of Firm Behavior 
 
Models that explicitly incorporate the dynamics consistent with some firms thriving while 
others  lag  and  exit  include  Jovanovic  (1982),  Hopenhayn  (1992),  and  Hopenhayn  and 
Rogerson (1993). 
 
Jovanovic (1982) proposes a passive learning model of industry evolution based on firm 
heterogeneity  and  self-selection.  Each  firm  has  some  true  underlying  production  cost,  c, 
which is a draw from a normal distribution with mean  c and variance 
￿ 2
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the cost distribution, but not its own cost parameter. Each period the firm’s unit cost of 
production fluctuates randomly around the mean. From observing it over time, the firm learns 
about its underlying cost and is able to estimate it consistently as the time average of its 
observations. Each period the firm decides whether to exit or stay in operation based upon its 
current cost information. The evolution of the economy is then driven by the learning and 
selection decisions of these optimizing agents. Productivity can be viewed here as the dual of 
costs. From an analytical point of view, the notion that a firm’s decision is based on its entire 
history  of  productivity  draws  would  hardly  be  empirically  tractable.  The  length  of  the 
dependence period would need to be restricted to that of the observed data. 
 
Hopenhayn (1992) proposes a model in the same line of passive learning, in which firms are 
subject to a random productivity shock every period. This productivity shock follows a first-
order Markov process that is independent across firms. The distribution of future productivity 
is assumed to be stochastically increasing in this period’s productivity. Surviving firms pay a 
fixed cost each period, then observe their productivity shock, and decide on a level of output 
for  that  period.  Entrants  pay  an  entry  fee,  and  then  draw  from  a  common  underlying 
distribution of productivity shocks, and choose output. Exiting firms make no profits, and pay 
no  costs. This framework  allows Hopenhayn to  derive equilibrium conditions that imply 
predictions about the productivity of entrants, incumbents, and exiting firms. 
 
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) propose a variant of this model and use it to evaluate the 
aggregate implications of government policies that make it costly for firms to adjust their 
labor.  Using  a  value  function  that  explicitly  includes  an  adjustment  cost  for  labor,  they 
develop an equilibrium model of the reallocation process of labor across firms. They prove 
the existence of an equilibrium that has entry, exit, and the growth and decline of firms over 
time. 
 
Ericson and Pakes (1995) introduce the concept of active learning. They develop a dynamic 
model of a small, imperfectly competitive industry with a stochastic process of accumulation 
for the state variable, in which an active exploration process drives the firms’ learning about 
their efficiency. A variation of this framework may be applied to investigate how the firm’s 
learning process about its efficiency determines its decision to be vertically integrated or not, 
and how this learning process itself is affected by the firm’s choice of integration status.  
 
 
4.2.2 Estimation of Productivity  
 
Since productivity is not directly observable, to examine it requires one to first of all find a 
way of measuring it. If one is going to estimate total factor productivity, the simplest way to 
do this is to estimate a production function using OLS and use the residuals from such a 
regression as the measure of productivity. The problem with this approach was pointed out 
long ago by Maarshak and Andrews (1944): input choices are likely to be correlated with 
unobserved productivity. To the extent that this happens, the OLS estimates will be biased 
and  will  yield  a  biased  measure  of  productivity.  The  usual  approach  to  deal  with  this 
simultaneity problem is to use Instrumental Variables estimators. However, with plant-level Chapter 4: Dynamic Model of Vertical Integration    17 
 
 
data it is very hard to find valid instruments, because most variables that are correlated with 
input choices are correlated with productivity. A solution to the unavailability of appropriate 
instruments has often been to adopt a fixed effects estimator, but this estimator assumes that 
firm-level productivity is constant over time.  
 
As an alternative, Cornwell et. al. (1990) use a plant-specific and time-varying efficiency that 
can  be described as  a  quadratic  function  of  time.  This  methodology is  also  used in  Liu 
(1993), and Liu and Tybout (1996). It requires one to first estimate the production function 
by fixed effects in order to obtain the input coefficient vector. The residuals are calculated by 
subtracting  the  actual  values  from  the  predicted  values  of  output.  For  each  plant,  these 
residuals are regressed on a constant, time, and time squared. The productivity measure is 
constructed using the estimates of the coefficients from the last regression. This approach 
improves on the fixed-effects methodology, but since it requires a parametric specification of 
productivity  many  degrees  of  freedom  are  lost  in  the  estimation  process.  Moreover, this 
procedure still uses fixed effects estimation in the first step that provides the residual for the 
construction of the productivity measure. So although the measure does vary over time, it is 
still likely to be based on biased coefficients in the presence of simultaneity.  
 
Olley and Pakes (1996) provide a methodology that deals explicitly with the simultaneity 
problem described above. They also deal with the selection problem arising from the fact that 
firms’ exit decisions depend on their perceptions of future productivity, which are in turn 
partially determined by their current productivity, making balanced  panel data sets to be 
selected in part on the basis of unobserved productivity realizations. Their contribution falls 
into both of the categories in this literature to the extent that it models firm behavior in a 
dynamic framework with the empirical goal of obtaining unbiased measures of plant-level 
productivity. Their model combines features of both the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model 
with features of the Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) model, and allows for firm-specific 
efficiency  differences  that  exhibit  idiosyncratic  changes  over  time.  To  sort  out  the 
simultaneity problem, the model specifies the information available when input decisions are 
made. To control for the selection induced by exit, the model generates an exit rule.  
 
Olley and Pakes (1996) provide a framework for analyzing the biases in traditional estimators 
that  result  from  selection  and  simultaneity,  and  for  building  alternative  algorithms  that 
circumvent these biases. Variations of this model may, for instance, be applied to uncover the 
relationship between firm productivity and vertical integration in the presence of possibly 
endogenously determined variables such as firm size or market concentration.  
 
 
4.3 The Model 
 
My empirical goal is to learn about what causes a firm to vertically integrate backwards into 
the production  of an intermediate input. In particular  I want to learn  about productivity, 
reveal  its  role  in  this  decision  process,  and  understand  its  relationship  with  vertical 
integration,  accounting  for  the  unobserved  firm-specific  features  that  underlie  the  firm's 
decision process. To do so I will employ a panel data set describing, at the plant-level, the Chapter 4: Dynamic Model of Vertical Integration    18 
 
 
integration and production decisions of a group of paper firms. Such firms must typically 
decide whether to integrate backwards into the production of pulp. A la Olley and Pakes 
(1996), I intend to learn about an unobserved attribute of these firms, i.e. their productivity, 
by exploiting the entry/exit features of my data. I maintain that productivity is not only a 
major  determinant  of  whether  a  firm  exits  or  enters  the  market,  but  it  is  also  a  major 
determinant  of  whether  a  firm  vertically  integrates  backward  or  specializes  in  paper 
production. To ignore its role in a reduced form model can give rise to two problems. First, to 
the extent that differences in productivity are known to firms when they make their decision 
whether to vertically integrate or not (and productivity of a given firm has been shown to be 
highly correlated over time (Olley and Pakes, 1996)), there is a classic simultaneity problem. 
Second, the entry and exit observed in the industry over the period being studied raise the 
issue of how to handle  attrition from,  and additions to, the data.  If firms' exit decisions 
depend on their perceptions of their future productivity, and if their perceptions are partially 
affected by their current productivity, then a panel sample will be partly selected on the basis 
of  the  unobserved  productivity  realizations,  and  there  will  be  a  selection  bias  in  the 
estimation of the model. 
  
A  dynamic  model  of  firm  behavior  that  allows  for  firm-specific  productivity  differences 
allows  me  to  deal  with  the  selection  and  the  simultaneity  problems.  To  sort  out  the 
simultaneity  problem,  the  model  specifies  the  information  available  when  the  vertical 
integration decision is made. To control for the selection induced by exit decisions, the model 
generates an exit rule. 
 
Moreover,  it  seems  sensible  to  frame  the  decision  of  a  firm  to  vertically  integrate  as  a 
dynamic problem if we believe that firm managers are forward looking decision-makers, who 
take  into  account  the  effect  of  their  choices  today  on  the  performance  of  their  firms 
tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and so on. In pursuit of profit maximization, firm 
managers must act not only upon the current information available, but they must also take 
into consideration their expectations about the future. 
 
The Incumbent Paper Mill Problem 
 
I envision the incumbent paper mill as solving the following general optimization problem. 
At the beginning of every period, the firm first chooses whether to exit or to continue in the 
market.  In making this decision, it compares its sell-off value in dollars to the expected 
present discounted  value of the stream  of profits that will accrue to it if it continues in 
operation. This present value, in turn, depends on whether the mill is specialized or vertically 
integrated.  If the mill exits, it receives its sell-off value  and never reappears again.  If it 
decides to continue in operation it then chooses whether or not to produce its own input 
(whether  to  specialize,  or  vertically  integrate).  The  mill  will  vertically  integrate  if  its 
expected present discounted value of profits from integration exceeds the expected present 
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The current period operating profits of the nonintegrated paper mill 
 
The  current  period  profits  of  the  nonintegrated  paper  mill  i  operating  in  market  m  are 
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￿ i) is written as a function of labor, Lim, pulp, Pim, 
and a mill-specific index of unobserved productivity, 
￿ i, and pm(.) denotes the market price 
for paper, determined by the total market output of paper Qm. In order to keep my model 
computationally tractable, I am assuming that mill i is small and takes the other mills’ outputs 
as given (i.e. there is no multi-agent dynamic problem in this model). 
 
On the costs side, the nonintegrated firm i pays the market wage rate, wm, in exchange for 
labor, and the price p
N
im in exchange for pulp. The price for pulp is written as a function of 
asset-specific factors, which are costly to the nonintegrated firm, and of concentration in the 
pulp market. Fim represents closeness to forestland. Fim is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 whenever the firm is located in the South or West regions, where most of the 
forestland in the U.S. is found, and it proxies for site specificity. Ni represents the production 
of newsprint, a standardized paper grade, that is usually produced on a larger scale than other 
specialized  finer  grades  of  paper  which  are  produced  in  smaller  batches  (to  order),  and 
requires a less complex mix of pulps than the finer grades. It is also a dummy variable, and it 
proxies for asset specificity, because newsprint production requires the specialization of the 
pulping assets to conform to the requirements of the papermaker. Mm is a measure of market 
concentration  in  the  input  market.  I  expect  that  the  costs  associated  with  investment 
specificity as well as the costs associated with market concentration should be reflected in a 
higher pulp cost for the mill that is not integrated.  
 
This profit function is written under the assumption that the firm produces a single paper 
grade, and uses a single pulp type in its production process. While this is true in many cases, 
in others it is a simplification that we should be aware of. 
 
 
The Current Period Operating Profits of the Integrated Paper Mill 
 
Similarly, under the assumption that vertically integrated firms do not participate as suppliers 
in the pulp market, the current period profits of the vertically integrated firm i operating in 
















￿ i) represents firm i’s production and pm denotes the market price for 
paper. On the costs side, firm i again pays the market wage, wm for labor, Lim. Now, however 
it pays a different price for pulp that is denoted as p
I
im. This price is assumed to be lower than 
p
N
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costs arising from the environmental regulation under the Clean Water Act of 1972 and its 
amendments. Environmental regulation under the Clean Water Act affects the pulp industry 
since it is a highly water polluting industrial activity.
8 These costs are assumed to be an 
increasing function of the water quality standards set by the state in which the integrated firm 
operates, 
￿
m. To explain the reasoning that underlies this assumption, in what follows I briefly 
summarize the dispositions of the Clean Water Act. 
 
The Clean Water Act required all municipal and industrial wastewater to be treated before 
being  discharged  into  waterways.  Industries  were  given  until  July  1977,  to  install  "best 
practicable  control  technology"  (BPT)  to  clean  up  waste  discharges.  By  March  1989, 
industries were required to use the "best available technology" (BAT) that was economically 
achievable. In addition, states were required to implement control strategies for water that 
was  expected  to  remain  polluted  even  after  industrial  dischargers  had  installed  the  best 
available  cleanup  technologies  required  under  the  law.  The  federal  government  sets  the 
agenda  and  standards  for  pollution  abatement,  while  the  states  carry  out  the  day-to-day 
activities  of  implementation  and  enforcement.  The  states  are  responsible  for  establishing 
water quality standards, consistent of a designated use (recreation, water supply, industrial, or 
other), and a numeric or narrative statement identifying maximum concentration levels of 
various pollutants that would not interfere with the designated use.  
 
Delegated responsibilities under the Act include authority for qualified states to issue and 
enforce discharge permits to industries and municipalities.
9 All discharges into the nation's 
waters are unlawful, unless specifically authorized by a permit. Permits specify the control 
technology applicable to each pollutant, the effluent limitations a discharger must meet, and 
the  deadline  for  compliance.  They  are  issued  for  5-year  periods  and  must  be  renewed 
thereafter to allow continued discharge. The Environmental Protection Agency may issue a 
compliance order or bring a civil suit in a U.S. district court to violators of the terms of a 
permit. The penalty for such violations can be as high as $25,000 per day. Stiffer penalties 
are authorized for criminal violations of the Act.  
 
States with higher water quality standards do not allow as much polluting discharges and 
cause pulp producers to be more at risk of committing a violation of their polluting permits. 
Hence, vertically integrated firms face higher latent liability costs when operating in states 
with relatively high water quality standards. In addition, it is to be expected that firms will 
want to avoid as much as possible appearing in the news as environmental law-breakers. This 
could be particularly harmful to large multi-plant firms that operate in several states. So the 
environmental  regulation  is  likely  to  be  more  costly  to  large  vertically  integrated  firms. 
Finally, the environmental regulation under the Clean Water Act often implies that firms 
must  invest  in  new  cleaner  technologies.  To  this  extent  the  more  productive  firms  are 
expected to face lower environmental costs, since they are expected to be already employing 
the best available technologies. 
                                                           
8 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, Public Law 92-500, 1972; Clean Water Act of 1977, Public Law 
95-217; Municipal Wastewater  Treatment Construction Grants Amendments, 1981, Public Law 97-117;  Water 
Quality Act of 1987, Public Law 100-4. 
9 As of December 1998, 43 states had been delegated the permit program. The Environmental Protection Agency 





The Dynamic Problem  
 
Define Yt as a binary variable such that Yt = 1 if the incumbent firm is vertically integrated at 
time t, and Yt = 0 if the incumbent firm is specialized at time t. Also suppose a firm incurs a 
cost of F dollars when it decides to integrate, and receives a sell-off value of Z dollars when 
it decides to disintegrate. 
 
I assume that firm managers plan their market participation and their vertical integration 
status to satisfy: 
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where  the  profits  of  the  integrated  and  the  nonintegrated  mill  are  functions  of  the  state 
variable w, whose evolution can affect the mills’ choices to vertically integrate or not, as well 
as to remain active, and of 
I
t X  and 
N
t X , the sets of exogenous variables that help determine 





N represent the exit fees of the integrated and of the nonintegrated firm respectively, 
Et is an expectations operator conditioned on the set of information available at time t, and 
￿  
is the one period (i.e., 5 year) discount rate. 
 
The Bellman equation for an incumbent mill can then be written as: 
 
 
This equation states that the value today is composed of current returns plus the expected 
discounted value of tomorrow given optimal behavior in the interim. The solution to this 
functional equation generates an exit rule and a vertical integration policy function that can 
be combined into a single policy rule for each mill type. A mill has three possible choices of 
status: it can choose to exit, it can choose to stay in operation and be disintegrated, and it can 
choose to stay in operation and be integrated. If a function Rt is defined to be equal to zero 
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(0) if the firm exits, one (1) if the firm chooses to be in and disintegrated, and two (2) if the 
firm chooses to be in and integrated, then the policy rule that determines the mill’s choice of 








Vertically integrated incumbents that choose to stay in operation choose to remain vertically 
integrated whenever current net operating profits from vertical integration plus the expected 
discounted future payoff from remaining vertically integrated exceeds the sell-off value from 
disintegration, Z. Nonintegrated incumbents choose to integrate whenever this sum, net of the 
fixed cost to vertically integrate, F, is positive.  
 
 
4.4   The Model Simplified for Estimation 
 
Paper mills are seen as maximizing their average profits or, equivalently, minimizing their 
costs per unit for a given amount of production. This is a simplified view of how they operate 
that places the focus on productivity maximization and allows me to temporarily overlook the 
mill’s choice of capacity.  In this section I derive the functional forms that will be taken to 
the data. 
 
The Paper Mill’s Production Function 
 
I assume that the industry uses a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce paper. In the short-run 






where Li is labor, Pi is pulp, and f(wi) is a function of an index of unobserved productivity, wi, 
which is a firm-specific state variable. I further assume that the technology used in paper 
production is constant returns to scale, so 0<a<1, 0<b<1, and (a + b) = 1. 
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This production function is written under the assumption already stated that the mill produces 
a  single  paper  grade,  and  uses  a  single  pulp  type  in  its  production  process.  I  am  also 
maintaining the assumption that vertically integrated mills do not participate as suppliers in 
the pulp market. 
 
The Paper Mill’s Average Cost Function 
 
Paper firm i, operating in market m, faces the following cost minimization problem: 
 
( ) P
￿ L w min i i m +         ( ) P L
￿




i i =  
       
where wm is the wage rate in market m, p is the cost of pulp in market m for firm i, and qi  is 
the fixed amount of output that firm i wants to produce. The standard solution to this problem 
yields the following cost function for firm i: 
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The mill’s average cost function can then be written as 
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I  expect  that  the  integrated  and  the  nonintegrated  paper  mills  differ  in  the  way  their 
unobserved productivity enters their cost functions. Hence, 
 
( ) ( ) f f i
I
i
N ¹   
 
where the superscript N denotes the nonintegrated paper firm, and the superscript I denotes 
the integrated paper firm. If it is true that unobserved productivity explains in part why some 
paper firms choose to be vertically integrated and some do not, then this must be true. I 
further expect that f
I(wi) > f
N(wi). This should be demonstrated by the data.  
 
The average cost functions of the integrated and the nonintegrated paper firms will also differ 
in the price firms ultimately pay for pulp, p. In the case of the nonintegrated firm, p
N is meant 
to reflect not only the market price per ton of pulp, but also additional costs incurred by the 
firm such as transaction costs from site or asset specificity, or costs from having to operate in 
a concentrated pulp market.  In the case of the integrated firm, p
I is meant to reflect the 
marginal cost of producing a ton of pulp.  
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The Paper Mill’s Current Period Average Profit Function 
 
The integrated mill 
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The disintegrated mill 
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where p is the price per unit of paper. 
 
 
The Dynamic Problem  
 
As before, Yt is a binary variable set equal to 1 if the incumbent mill is vertically integrated 
at time t, and equal to 0 if the incumbent mill is specialized at time t. Also as before, a 
nonintegrated mill incurs a cost of F dollars when it decides to integrate. For identification 
purposes, the  salvage  value  of Z dollars that an integrated mill receives if it chooses to 
disintegrate is set to zero. 
 
Managers plan their market participation and their vertical integration status to satisfy: 
 
( ) [ ]














































￿ ) (t ) t - (
￿
t
0 r ) Y
t
q Y 1




max V  
 
where F represents the exit fee to be paid by the mill that decides to leave the industry, Et is 
an expectations operator conditioned on the set of information available at time t, 
￿  is the one 
period (i.e., 5 year) discount rate, and  q
I
￿
) (t+ Õ  and  q
N
￿
) (t+ Õ  denote the average profit 
functions of the integrated and of the nonintegrated paper mills respectively, 
 
At the beginning of every period the incumbent mill has two decisions to make. The first is to 
decide whether to exit or continue in operation. If it exits, it receives a sell-off value of 
F dollars, and never reappears again. If it continues, it chooses its integration status (Yt = 1, 
or Yt = 0). If at time (t-1) the paper mill was not integrated (Y(t-1) = 0) and at time t it chooses 
to integrate (Yt = 1), its value function will be composed of its current period average profits 
as an integrated mill minus a cost to integrate of F dollars, plus the present discounted value 
of its expected future average profits as an integrated mill, given the current information. If it 
chooses to remain disintegrated (Yt = 0), its value function will be composed of its current Chapter 4: Dynamic Model of Vertical Integration    25 
 
 
period  average  profits  as  a  disintegrated  mill,  plus  the  present  discounted  value  of  its 
expected future average profits as a disintegrated mill, given current information. If at time 
(t-1) the mill was integrated (Y(t-1) = 1) and at time t it chooses to disintegrate (Yt = 0), its 
value function will be composed of its current period average profits as a disintegrated mill 
plus the present discounted value of its expected average profits as a disintegrated mill, given 
the current information. Finally, if the mill was integrated at time (t-1) (Y(t-1) = 1) and it 
chooses to remain integrated (Yt = 1), its value function will be composed of its current 
period average profits as an integrated mill plus the present discounted value of its expected 
future average profits as an integrated mill, given current information. Therefore, both the 
exit and the integration decisions will depend on the mill’s perceptions of the future, given 
current information. The exit and integration decisions generated by these perceptions will, in 
turn generate the market structure (i.e. productivity and integration status pair for each active 
mill) for the future years. 
 
The Bellman equation for an incumbent mill can then be written as: 
 
 
where  () . AVG
I
t P   and  () . AVG
N
t P   denote  the  average  profits  of  the  integrated  and  the 
nonintegrated mill respectively. 
 
The status choice rule generated by the solution to this problem is unchanged relative to that 
presented in the previous section:  
 
 
Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) give in detail the conditions under which any V(.) which 
solves the Bellman equation is equal to V* defined as the supremum of the value function 
evaluated at the optimal policy path. They also provide the conditions under which any Rt(.) 
that solves the Bellman equation, is an optimal policy for V*. A sufficient condition for both 
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Define B as the set of bounded profit functions of both types of mills on  Â  (assume that 
profits  are  bounded  from  above),  and  define 
￿ (.)  as  the  sup  norm 
( ) ( ) ( ) x g x f g f,
￿  i.e. supx - = Â Î .  The  Bellman  equation  is  a  fixed  point  to  the  operator  T 
where T: B
￿  B and is defined pointwise by  
 
 
The exogenous variables in this problem enter as state variables for which the mill manager 
is assumed to have myopic expectations. The stochastic process generating the sequence of 
realizations {wt} is a Markov Process, the distribution of w(t+1) being determined by wt. If X 
denotes the set of exogenous state variables, then there is a set of distribution functions for 
each possible (w, X) couple. This determines the distribution of w(t+1) given wt:  
 
The mill behavior characterized above implies that paper producers stay in the market as long 
as the present discounted value of their expected average profits if they stay in operation is 
more than the fee they receive if they choose to exit. If they choose to stay in operation then, 
their choice to vertically integrate is driven by 
 
 
A  vertically  integrated  mill  will  choose  to  continue  operating  as  vertically  integrated 
whenever  the  profit  difference  above  is  greater  than  zero  (its  sell-off  value  from 
disintegration). A nonintegrated mill will choose to integrate whenever this amount is greater 
than the fixed cost to vertically integrate, F. 
 
The dual problem 
 
Equivalently, the problem facing the mill can be approached directly from the cost side. 
Productivity  maximization  is  equivalent  to  minimization  of  costs  per  unit.  The  mill’s 
behavior can alternatively be characterized by: 
 
















+ + - + + +
¥






























{ ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) [ ]




  Y) , '
￿ , '  
￿ , w' ,
￿ '     '
￿ ' p(   Y' , ' '
￿ , ' '  




￿ ,  w' ,
￿ ' AVG ) ' Y (1
F Y 1 '  
￿ ,  w' ,
￿ ' AVG Y'   sup  
, max  Y , '
￿ , '  
￿ ,  w' ,
￿ ' Tf
' '
￿ , ' '  
￿ , ' w' , '
￿ '









0))] /(Y (V E -   )) 1 /(Y (V
￿
[E + ) X   , (
￿ AVG
￿ ) X , (
￿ AVG             5) (
1) (t












= = - PChapter 4: Dynamic Model of Vertical Integration    27 
 
 
where F represents the exit fee to be paid by the mill that decides to leave the industry, Et is 
an expectations operator conditioned on the set of information available at time t, 
￿
 is the one 
period (i.e., 5 year) discount rate, and 
I
t C  and 
N
t C  denote the average cost functions of the 
integrated and of the nonintegrated paper mills respectively, 
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The Bellman equation for an incumbent mill is written as: 
 
The  status  choice  rule  generated  by  the  solution  to  this  problem  is  identical  to  the  one 
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5.1.   Motivation 
 
The  aspect  of  firm  behavior  that  the  dynamic  model  presented  in  the  previous  section 
captures relies on the belief that productivity is not only a major determinant of whether a 
firm exits or enters the market, but also a major determinant of whether a firm vertically 
integrates  backward  or  specializes  in  paper  production.  By  explicitly  allowing  for  the 
estimation  of  firm  level  unobserved  productivity,  the  dynamic  approach  proposed  in this 
dissertation takes care of the estimation biases that may arise from simultaneity and selection 
in a reduced form model, which ignores its role in the firm’s decision process.  
 
In order to show the workings of my dynamic approach, and to better motivate the estimation 
exercise that is presented in the following chapter, I have used my model to simulate data for 
500 firms over 5 periods. In this section I present a brief description of the process by which 
the data were simulated, and I present the results obtained when these data are used in the 
estimation of a reduced form model of vertical integration, similar to the model presented in 
Chapter 3. 
 
5.2    Simulation Process 
 
I use my dynamic model to build an artificial dataset of 500 mills over ten periods of time. I 
do this by simulating the behavior of each mill, i.e. each mill’s choice of policy for every 
point in time, where the choices available to the mill at the beginning of each period are to 
stay in operation and produce its own input, to stay in operation and obtain its input through 
outsourcing, or to exit the industry. A mill that exits never reappears in the industry. 
 
The model is set so that every period the previous integration status of a mill affects the 
policy  path  that  mill  will  follow  (the  previous  period  integration  status  enters  as  a  state 
variable in the value function iteration). So for each particular mill the process of simulating 
a chain of data starts with a random draw for the previous period integration status, and a 
random draw for each of the variables that enter the mill’s average cost function that the mill 
minimizes  when  it  makes  its  status  choice.  The  value  function  for  this  mill  at  time  t  is 
calculated for these specific values, using a given set of parameters. The outcome of the 
value function iteration is a policy choice for each of the possible values of the unobserved 
productivity  index,  w
10.   The  next  step  is  to  make  a  draw  for  the  mill’s  unobserved 
productivity index in period t, wit, and to use the solution of the value function to determine 
the behavior of the mill, given the values of the simulated data.  
 
                                                           
10  Details about the value function estimation are presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 5: Simulation Exercise    29 
 
 
The process is repeated for periods (t+1) and after, with the difference that now the previous 
period integration status is no longer a random draw, but is instead taken from the previous 
period simulated policy decision made by the mill. Also, the previous period draws for the 
variables that change over time, will now affect the distribution from which the new draws 
will be made. The assumption made in most cases is that the exogenous variables follow a 
random walk, in which the coefficient on the previous period observation of each variable is 
set equal to 1 (i.e. the previous period observation for variable j at time t, becomes the mean 
of the distribution of variable j at time (t+1)). The updates in all exogenous variables are 
assumed to be normally distributed. The only variable whose distribution is set to follow a 
more complicated Markov process over time is the market concentration measure. I allow the 
period t unobserved productivity draw for mill i, to affect the path followed by the market 
concentration faced by that mill from time (t+1) on. I do this by letting the productivity shock 
at time t (wit – mean (wit )) alter the mean of the distribution of the market concentration 
measure at time (t+1). My intention is to replicate the endogeneity of market concentration 
and vertical integration, that is a concern from the reduced form model estimation presented 
in Chapter 3. I want to build artificial data that will induce the biases in estimation that I 
found when dealing with the real data. This will then allow me to show how the structural 
dynamic model that I am proposing takes care of these biases.  
 
For each period the mill’s value function is estimated, and a set of policy choices for each 
possible w value is obtained. A new draw for the mill’s current period w is used, as before, to 
determine  the  behavior  of  the  mill,  given  the  values  of  the  simulated  data.  Unobserved 
productivity for each mill is assumed to follow a parameterized Markov process. 
 
The  process  described  above  was  replicated  500  times,  and  the  outcome  is  the  artificial 
dataset described at the beginning of this section. Since the working of my dynamic model is 
based  upon  the  explicit  estimation  of  the  unobserved  productivity  of  each  mill  and  the 
artificial data were constructed using the model, this dataset has a particular feature: for each 
mill, for each point in time, and for each set of artificial variables used to simulate mill 
behavior, there is also a mill-specific productivity measure, wit. I point this out, because this 
is what will allow me to show the usefulness of the dynamic model approach proposed in the 
previous chapter, for dealing with the biases from simultaneity and selection that can arise in 
the estimation of a reduced form model. 
 
 
5.3  Functional Forms and Parameters 
 
In this section I introduce the functional forms, and the parameter values I have used to 
perform this simulation exercise.  
 
Unobserved Mill Productivity 
 
(1)    f





(2)    f










i is the index of productivity, known to the firm but unobserved by us.  
 
The productivity functions of both types of mills are assumed to be nonnegative (A
N => 0, A
I
 
=> 0) and concave (0 <= h1<= 1, 0 <= h2 <= 1) over the relevant 
￿
i range in order to ensure 
the convexity of the value function. 
 
Markov Process Governing Unobserved Productivity  
 
The  unobserved  productivity  index,  wit,  is  assumed  to  evolve  over  time  according  to  an 
exogenous Markov process: 
wi(t+1) = go + g1 wit + eit,     
 
where eit is a normally distributed error term. 
 
Price of pulp 
 
(1)    p
N(M)  =  l0 + l1M+ l2SW+ l3AS 
(2)    p
I(.)  =  l4 
 
 
where M is a measure of market concentration, SW is a forest land dummy thought as a 
proxy for site specificity, and AS is some asset specificity measure. 
 
 
Current Period Average Costs  
 
Incorporating the above, I arrive at the average cost functions used in the process of data 
simulation: 
 
( ) ( )








￿ ) w (
q
q ,














I + = =
-
 
( ) ( )








￿ ) w (
q
q ,

































Table 5.1 presents the parameter values from which the artificial data were created. 
 
 
5.4  Simulated data 
 
Table  5.2  presents  summary  statistics  of  the  artificial  data  used  in  the  reduced  form 
estimation  of  section  5.5.  The  wage  was  simulated  because  it  is  a  variable  required  to 
estimate the static average cost functions that enter the structural model. It is not used in 
section 5.5.  Table 5.2 does not include the observations that correspond to exit choices. 
Table 5.3 presents some more telling integration and exit status statistics to further describe 
the simulated dataset. There is no entry in my artificial data. In period 1 there are 500 firms 
and I track their integration and exit behavior overtime. This is an important difference with 
the  real  paper  industry  data.  Also,  the  simulated  data  show  a  smaller  proportion  of 
disintegrated mills each period. 
 
 
5.5  Bias in Reduced Form Estimation 
 
I used the artificial dataset to estimate a reduced form model of vertical integration similar to 
that presented in Chapter 3: 
 
VIi = a0 + a1CONCi + a2SWi  + a3ASSET SPECIFICITYi + ei 
 
This version of the model was estimated for the pooled dataset and also as a panel, allowing 
for random and fixed effects, and in each case the estimation was repeated with a variation: 
the  inclusion  of  the  mill-specific  productivity  measure  among  the  explanatory  variables. 
Table 5.4 presents the results. 
 
By explicitly accounting for unobserved productivity, whose role is typically ignored in a 
reduced form model, I am able to produce a strong variation in the size and significance 
of  the  coefficient  on  the  variable  that  is  by  construction  endogenous  to  vertical 
integration.  This  will  also  be  true  for  the  real  data,  if  market  concentration  is  truly 
endogenous. As well, the explicit accounting for the unobservable takes care of the possible 
bias from selection, although this is harder to show in a reduced form framework. Recall that 
a selection bias in the estimation of the model arises from firms' exit decisions depending on 
their perceptions of their future productivity, and their perceptions being partially affected by 
their  current  productivity.  The  structural  model  looks  explicitly  at  the  mill-specific 
unobserved productivity realizations and provides an exit rule, based upon which a mill will 
decide to exit or stay in operation. Estimation in the dynamic model framework explicitly 
accounts  for  the  role  of  unobserved  mill  productivity  in  exit.  By  doing  so,  it  produces 








6.1.  Functional Forms 
 
In this Chapter, I describe in detail the steps required for the estimation of the structural 
model proposed in Chapter 4, and present some baseline results. The purpose of the empirical 
exercise presented here is to provide an idea of what the model allows. Because even the 
estimation of the model in its simplified version is computationally demanding, here I am 
using  one  of  the  most  basic  possible  versions  of  it.  The  functional  forms  specified  are 
identical to those used in the simulation exercise presented in Chapter 5, with the exception 
of the price of pulp for the nonintegrated firm, restricted even further for estimation:  
 
Price of pulp 
 
(1)    p
N(M)  =  l0 + l1M
 
(2)    p
I(.)  =  l2 
 
 
where M is a measure of market concentration. 
 
6.2 Estimation Strategy 
 
The  estimation  of  the  model  involves  dynamic  programming  techniques  nested  inside  a 
nonlinear search algorithm  over its  parameters. The estimation strategy  employed  can be 
broken into steps, as follows. 
 
Step 1: Derivation of the optimal policy rules 
 
The unobserved mill productivity index, wi, can take any value in a range between any two 
numbers. I selected 0 and 30 as limiting values and constructed a grid spaced at increments of 
0.1 over this range. I then used this grid to calculate the transition probability of w, under the 
assumption that it is normally distributed. The selection of the limit values of the grid range 
is arbitrary, and as good as any other for the purposes of my estimation. 
 
I started with a parameterized simple
11 version of the static average cost functions for both 
the mill that was integrated and the mill that was not integrated in the previous period, and 
calculated the static average costs of both types of mills for all the possible values of w. 
Using these static cost functions, a guess of the first period’s value of the mill, and a guess of 
the  mill’s  status  at  time  t  (out,  in  and  disintegrated  or  in  and  integrated),  I  was  able  to 
                                                           
11   The only variable that entered these first-stage cost functions was the endogenous productivity index. All other 
variables were temporarily made into constants.  Chapter 6: Empirical Estimation     33 
 
 
calculate the value function of both mill types for all possible w values. I then used value 
function iteration to obtain the optimal choice of status policy rule, Rt, for both the mill that 
was integrated at time (t-1) and the mill that was not integrated at time (t-1). 
 
The optimal policy rules obtained from the convergence of the value function iteration allow 
me to identify two sets of cut-offs on the grid of w: the cut-off values of w for which a 
nonintegrated firm will switch to integration and an integrated firm will disintegrate, and the 
cut-off values of w below which an integrated and a nonintegrated firm will choose to exit 
the industry. These cut-offs are, however, bound by construction to fall on grid points. Since 
there is no reason for the correct policy cut-offs to fall exactly on grid nodes rather than in 
between  any  two  of  them,  there  is  a  need  to  restart  the  value  function  iteration  in  the 
“optimal” cut-off range, now allowing for the possibility of a solution in continuous space. 
This is possible by using linear splines between the grid nodes. The solution to this value 
iteration is still in the form of discrete cut-offs, but now not restricted to fall on grid nodes. 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the choice of status policy rules of a formerly integrated (Y(t-1) = 1) and of a 
formerly disintegrated (Y(t-1) = 0) paper firm, with the corresponding exit and integration 
w cutoffs. In this picture, the policy rule of each firm takes the value of zero (0) when the 
firm is out, one (1) when the firm is in and disintegrated, and two (2) when the firm is in and 
integrated. 
 
It seems reasonable to expect that, when compared to a disintegrated mill of the same size, 
the  integrated  mill  will  exit  and  switch  integration  status  at  lower  values  of  w  than  the 
disintegrated.  It  takes  a  greater  negative  productivity  shock  to  make  the  integrated  mill 
change status because it is assumed to have started out in a higher productivity range. There 
is no reason, however, to expect that the pattern depicted above should hold in general for all 
integrated vs. nonintegrated mills, and ultimately we will allow the data to tell us what sort of 
pattern holds. 
 
Step 2: Monte Carlo Integration of the expected likelihood function 
 
I start by simulating for each mill a string of wi’s that supports the data. I use a temporarily 
parameterized Markov process for w, and the cutoffs from the choice of status rules that 
solve my value function, to take sequences of random draws for w from a truncated normal 
distribution, where truncation each time occurs at the cutoff ws. This procedure guarantees 
that my draws in each case come from the set of unobservables that support the observed 
data. Each mill’s sequence of wi’s is then such that its observed policy path can be exactly 




Denote the exit and integration cutoffs from the choice of status rules that solve my value 
function  as 
￿
E
I   and 
￿
I
I   for  the  mill  that  was  integrated  at  time  (t-1)  ( ) 1 Y 1) (t = - . 
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not integrated at time (t-1) ( ) 0 Y 1) (t = - . Then suppose we observe the status of a mill over five 
time periods. We start with time (t-1) in which the mill is active and not integrated, and we 
observe  the  following  chain  of  status  choices:  at  time  t  the  firm  remains  active  and 
disintegrated, at time (t+1) the mill is active and it has switched to integration, at time (t+2) 
the mill is active and back to being disintegrated, and at time (t+3) the mill is no longer in the 
dataset having chosen to exit. Table 6.1 tracks these changes of status and the corresponding 
path  for  this  mill’s  unobserved  productivity  index,  w, and  Figure  6.2  illustrates how  the 
drawing from a truncated normal distribution is carried out. 
 
Notice that the data from time (t-1), i.e. the first period for which I observe the mill, is used 
only to obtain the information about the mill’s previous period’s integration status, which is 
then used to determine what cutoffs are to be taken as truncation limits for the next period’s 
random draw. The mean w at time t is a parameter to be estimated. For the following time 
periods the mean is obtained directly from the Markov process that governs w. In order to 
perform these draws, the other piece  of information that  I need is the variance  of the w 
distribution. This is yet another parameter that needs to be estimated. 
 
I take 500 vectors of simulated w paths for each mill in my data, such that if they had actually 
occurred  they  would  have  supported  the  policy  paths  that  I  observe.  From  the  normal 
distribution and the information I have about the mean, the variance and the range in which w 
falls each period, I am able to compute the probability of actually observing each w path. I do 
this for each of the 500 vectors of simulated w’s that correspond to each mill, and average 
over  them  to  obtain  an  accurate  probability  measure.  I  then  convert  these  average 
probabilities into logarithms, and obtain the overall likelihood numerically, as the summation 
of these probabilities in logarithmic form. 
 
More formally, the likelihood function of my model can be written as 
 
where  it X  represents the  exogenous variables  entering the value function, 
￿
 denotes the 
parameter vector, and  () . f  is the (average) normal density function giving us the probability 
for firm i at time t of the observed status actually occurring, i.e. the probability that we would 
actually observe a realization of   it
￿  in the  it
￿  range obtained from the choice of status rules 
that solve the value function. 
 
 
Step 3: Inclusion of exogenous variables  
 
Once the mechanics of estimation are working smoothly, the exogenous variables can be 
added. The full version of the model requires the inclusion of wage data and concentration 
measures to the average cost functions. 
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The  addition  of  the  exogenous  variables  builds  upon  the  already  existing  computational 
structure. Recall that the exogenous variables enter the value function as state variables for 
which the mill manager has myopic expectations. For each possible combination of values 
taken by each of the exogenous variables there will be a new set of solution cut-offs. The 
computationally efficient way to go about this calls again for the use of linear interpolation 
splines. For each exogenous variable a set of representative values is selected for which the 
full value function iteration is performed and optimal exit and integration cut-offs obtained. 
Since for each mill there is an idiosyncratic combination of values in the exogenous variable 
data, the individual set of optimal cut-offs for each mill is then obtained by interpolation. 
 
The overall likelihood of the model is obtained as before, only now the random draws for w 




Step 4: Maximum likelihood optimization 
 
The Monte Carlo integration procedure to obtain the expected likelihood function is used to 
perform a grid search over the model parameters in order to obtain good starting values, and 
is then nested in an optimization algorithm to obtain the final parameter estimates. 
 
 
6.3  Baseline Results 
 
Table 6.2 presents the results of my estimation exercise. As expected, the parameters of the 
functions of unobserved productivity that enter the average cost function of each type of firm, 
f 
I (w) and f 
N (w), are such that as mill productivity becomes higher, average costs decrease 
(i.e. for both types of firms f (w) is an increasing function of w). More importantly, the 
parameters of these functions of unobserved productivity are such that f 
I (w) > f 
N (w) for 
mill productivity above a certain level (see Figure 6.3).  The direction of the inequality is as 
expected, and the cost reducing impact of productivity becoming higher for the integrated 
mill  only  after  a  certain  productivity  level  makes  sense  if  one  thinks  about  the  cost  in 
performance  that  could  come  about  when  a  low  productivity  plant  (a  plant  with  poor 
management, for instance) decides to expand into its input production.  
 
As for the parameters that enter the specification of the price of pulp for the non-integrated 
mill, lo is estimated relative to l2, the price of pulp of the integrated firm, with l2 set equal to 
15, so the estimation outcome is a 1.03 to 1 ratio for the constant portion of the price. This is 
again as expected, since even before accounting for the implications of variables exogenous 
to the production process, you would expect the integrated firm to be able to get its own input 
at marginal cost.  The parameter reflecting the impact of market concentration on the price of 
pulp faced by the non-integrated firm, l1, has the correct sign but is not significant.  
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6.4  Implications for Productivity 
 
The empirical evidence presented in this Chapter is still not conclusive with respect to the 
impact of vertical integration on mill level productivity. The version of the model taken to 
estimation is stripped down to the very basics and to that extent cannot be expected to give a 
fully reliable account of reality. It does, however, contribute some intuitive results that allow 
me to show the usefulness of the model I propose, as a tool for unbiased estimation.  
 
Table  6.3  shows  the  results  from  interacting  in  a  regression  framework  the  mill  level 
unobserved  productivity  measure  backed  out  of  the  estimation  of  the  dynamic  model 
presented in section 6.3, with the mills’ integration decision.  Results are presented for the 
pooled dataset, as well as for the random-effects, and the fixed-effects panels. The outcomes 
are not very different across these models. In all cases the coefficient on the integration status 
dummy variable is positive and significant, suggesting that indeed mill level productivity 
depends on the mill’s integration status. 
 
Table  6.4  provides  a  simple  analysis  of  survival  probabilities  with  my  estimates  of 
productivity  growth.  As  theory  predicts,  the  exit  probability  is  negatively  related  to 
productivity  change.  These  results  confirm  the  importance  of  acknowledging  the  role  of 
unobserved mill efficiency in estimation in order to avoid biases from selection. 
 
Table 6.5 provides further evidence that the suspicions of endogeneity from the reduced form 
exercises  presented  in  Chapter  3  may  be  well  founded.  The  unobserved  mill  level 
productivity measures obtained in estimation are indeed positively correlated with firm size 
(as  measured  by  production  capacity),  and  negatively  correlated  to  all  of  the  alternative 
concentration measures considered.  
  
Finally, table 6.6 gives a taste of the possible results that can be produced using the estimated 
unobserved mill level efficiency measures. Aggregate level productivity is calculated as the 
capacity weighted average of individual mill productivity. 







7.1  Incorporating the Investment Decision 
 
The dynamic model of vertical integration presented in Chapter 4, and taken to estimation in 
its more simplified version, overlooks the mill’s choice of capacity (i.e. the mill’s investment 
decision).  For the purpose of this dissertation, such simplification is justified in terms of 
computational  convenience,  and  because  it  still  allows  me  to  focus  on  the  relationship 
between vertical integration and mill level productivity, which is what I intend to learn about. 
However, the characterization of mill behavior seems incomplete without taking into account 
its investment decision. In the remainder of this section I outline the structural model that 
would incorporate such decisions, allowing us to explore the three-fold relationship between 
investment choices, vertical integration and mill level productivity. 
 
The New Dynamic Problem  
 
As before, define Yt as a binary variable such that Yt = 1 if the incumbent firm is vertically 
integrated at time t, and Yt = 0 if the incumbent firm is specialized at time t. Also suppose a 
firm incurs a cost of F dollars when it decides to integrate, and receives a salvage value of Z 
dollars when it decides to disintegrate. 
 
 
Now we need an accumulation equation for capital, of the form: 
 
t t 1 t i k k + a = +  
 
where  t k represents the capital stock (i.e. installed capacity), and  t i represents the investment 
at time t. 
 
Mill managers are seen as planning their market participation, their investment each period, 
and their vertical integration status to satisfy: 
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where  the  profits  of  the  integrated  and  the  nonintegrated  mill  are  functions  of  the  state 
variable w, whose evolution can affect the mills’ choices to vertically integrate or not, as well 
as to remain active, the mill capacity level, kt, which enters the value function as a new state 
variable, and 
I
t X  and 
N
t X , the sets of exogenous variables that help determine the profits of 






N represent the exit fees of the integrated and of the nonintegrated firm respectively, 
Et is an expectations operator conditioned on the set of information available at time t, and 
￿
 
is the one period discount rate. 
 
The Bellman equation for an incumbent mill can then be written as: 
 
 
This equation states that the value today is composed of current returns plus the expected 
discounted value of tomorrow given optimal behavior in the interim. As before, the solution 
to this functional equation generates an exit rule, and a vertical integration policy function. In 
addition, it now also generates an investment demand function that can be written as: 
 
( ) 1 - t t t t t Y , k ,
￿ i i =  
 
This function it (.) is determined as part of the Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium and will 
depend on the parameters determining equilibrium behavior. 
 
 
7.2  Environmental Extension 
 
Chapter 4 presents some thoughts about the role of the environmental regulation under the 
Clean Water Act of 1972 in the decision of a paper mill whether or not to vertically integrate 
into pulp production. For the reasons exposed in Chapter 4, one would expect that mills 
operating under a stringent environmental regulation would choose not to integrate in order 
to avoid regulatory costs. An extension of this research would be to develop a version of the 
dynamic model to explicitly test this hypothesis. 
 
A possible approach would be to model the pulp price perceived by the mill that integrates as 
a function of the latent liability costs from environmental regulation under the Clean Water 
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where H(.) is increasing in the mill's paper production capacity, kt ,decreasing in the mill's 
unobserved productivity, wt, and increasing in the water quality standards set by the state in 
which the mill operates, St,.  







My  data  show  mills  of  similar  characteristics  (i.e.  size,  paper  type  produced,  location, 
etcetera) appearing to make different choices about their integration status. I have maintained 
that these differences in choices can be explained by mill level productivity, an unobserved, 
serially  correlated,  state  variable  that  is  a  determinant  of  both  survival  probabilities  and 
vertical  integration  choices.  By  making  the  efficiency  differences  an  integral  part  of  the 
process by which the industry behavior adjusts, the estimation methodology I propose in this 
dissertation takes care of the biases induced by selection and simultaneity in a reduced form 
approach. The simulation exercise presented in Chapter 5, shows how the inclusion of the 
unobservable backed out from the dynamics in the reduced form estimation corrects these 
biases.  
 
Although the empirical evidence from the estimation of the simplified version of the dynamic 
model proposed in this dissertation is still far from conclusive with respect to the impact of 
vertical integration on productivity in the paper industry, it gives a taste of the workings of 
the estimation methodology proposed. It also suggests that unobserved mill productivity and 
market  concentration  are  indeed  correlated,  which  would  explain  the  misbehavior  of  the 
coefficient on market concentration in the reduced form exercise. Also, my results show that 
exit behavior can be explained by unobserved mill level productivity. This is yet another 
proof that a reduced form approach that ignores the role of this unobservable will produce 
biased estimates. 
 
To delve deeper into the evolution of mill level productivity in the paper industry and its 
interaction  with  vertical  integration  decisions,  it  is  necessary  to  incorporate  the  mill’s 
investment decision into the model, as suggested in Chapter 7. That is the first direction in 
which this research shall be extended. 
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Appendix – Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2.1 – The U.S. pulp and paper industry 1975-1995 
  
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Number of mills
Paper only 354 310 332 286 297
Pulp only 21 30 30 28 31
Pulp and paper 230 280 227 222 211
Number of firms 281 265 258 236 235
Percent of single mill firms 68% 64% 67% 70% 67%
Total paper production (tons/day) 143,450 171,425 184,096 215,841 245,019
Total pulp production (tons/day) 118,624 138,526 148,414 171,625 178,211
Total market pulp (tons/day) 18,144 18,630 24,104 24,663
Total paper capacity (tons/day) 170,506 196,400 213,259 225,324 249,958
Total pulp capacity (tons/day) 151,597 170,353 171,833 183,897 199,094
Total market pulp (tons/day)
1 31,360 26,718 25,855 28,097 35,567
Production/Capacity ratios:
Paper 84% 87% 86% 96% 98%
Pulp 78% 81% 86% 93% 90%
Average paper mill production (tons/day) 246 291 329 425 482
Average pulp mill production (tons/day) 473 447 577 686 736
Sources: Post's Pulp and Paper Directory (1976,1981,1986); Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Paper and Allied Trades (1991, 1996); US Bureau of the 
Census, Current Industrial Reports, Pulp, Paper and Board, 1980, 1985
1 Market pulp capacity is calculated as the difference between pulp and paper capacities for all mills that report any pulp production capacity, after 
substracting the pulp that goes to close-by paper mills belonging to the same owner.
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Table 2.2 – Vertical integration in the U.S. paper industry: 1975-1995 
 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Number of paper mills 584 590 559 508 508
Number of pulp mills 251 310 257 250 242
Number of pulp and paper mills 230 280 227 222 211
230 280 227 222 211
% of paper mills 39% 47% 41% 44% 42%
% of pulp mills 92% 90% 88% 89% 87%
Number of integrated mills
1 269 311 246 241 233
Integrated paper capacity
1
(% total paper capacity) 79% 83% 79% 82% 80%
Integrated pulp capacity
1
(% total pulp capacity) 94% 94% 93% 93% 93%
Sources: Post's Pulp and Paper Directory (1976,1981,1986), Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Paper and Allied 
Trades (1991, 1996).
1 Including paper mills that are integrated not by in-site pulp production, but by the use of pulp from a close-by mill 
belonging to the same owner.
Number of mills reporting 
capacities for both pulp and paper
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Table 2.3 – Vertical integration by region: 1975-1995
1 
(Percent of vertically integrated paper mills) 
 
Region 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Northeast 26% 31% 24% 27% 26%
North Central 46% 53% 37% 42% 44%
South 73% 79% 70% 71% 64%
West 57% 60% 58% 61% 60%
Sources: Post's Pulp and Paper Directory (1976,1981,1986); Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Paper 
and Allied Trades (1991, 1996).
1 Including paper mills that are integrated not by in-site pulp production, but by the use of pulp from a




Table 2.4 – Paper mills with in-site pulp production: distribution of the pulp to paper 
capacities ratio (percent of mills in each range) 
 
Year Average
1 (Pulp/Paper) < 0.5  0.5<=(Pulp/Paper) <1 (Pulp/Paper)>=1
(Pulp/Paper)
1975 1.04 12% 26% 61%
0.77
1980 0.95 14% 31% 55%
0.53
1985 0.92 15% 40% 45%
0.50
1990 0.90 15% 43% 42%
0.49
1995 0.95 14% 41% 45%
0.50
Sources: Post's Pulp and Paper Directory (1976,1981,1986); Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Paper 
and Allied Trades (1991, 1996).
1 The standard deviation is presented in the second row.  Appendix – Tables and Figures    44 
 
 
Table 2.5 – Comparison of integrated versus nonintegrated paper mills
1 
 
Only Only Only Only Only
Integrated Paper Integrated Paper Integrated Paper Integrated Paper Integrated Paper
Number of mills 269 316 311 280 246 314 241 268 233 276
Average capacity (tons/day) 449 115 523 120 689 139 771 148 862 178
Percent of total mills:
Survived to 1995 72% 53% 71% 63% 82% 74% 93% 92%
Mills belonging to multi-plant firms 79% 60% 80% 64% 79% 64% 76% 62% 76% 66%
Producing more than one paper type 19% 11% 17% 11% 20% 10% 20% 8% 21% 8%
Newsprint 7% 1% 9% 0% 11% 0% 12% 1% 13% 0%
Book and Writing 25% 13% 23% 16% 29% 15% 30% 15% 30% 13%
Wrapping 12% 13% 10% 14% 10% 15% 11% 14% 11% 12%
Board 44% 43% 42% 44% 42% 48% 41% 52% 40% 53%
Sanitary 11% 12% 10% 10% 11% 10% 11% 5% 10% 7%
Industrial 9% 30% 15% 28% 11% 23% 9% 21% 6% 23%
Sources: Post's Pulp and Paper Directory (1976,1981,1986); Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Paper and Allied Trades (1991,1996)
1995 1975 1980 1985 1990
 
Table 2.6 – Distribution of paper capacity by relative size of mill capacity: 1975-1995 
 
Mill size
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Integrated mills
Under 0.1 4.2% 5.3% 3.6% 3.3% 2.5% 76 101 60 58 52
0.1 to 0.2 7.9% 9.3% 7.3% 6.1% 5.7% 54 67 49 41 41
0.2 to 0.3 10.5% 11.1% 8.9% 9.7% 9.5% 42 45 36 38 39
0.3 to 0.4 9.0% 9.0% 8.9% 8.8% 7.2% 26 26 25 25 21
0.4 to 0.5 10.4% 7.9% 6.6% 6.8% 7.6% 23 18 15 15 17
0.5 to 0.75 14.4% 19.8% 22.6% 22.5% 19.9% 24 33 38 38 34
0.75 to 1.0 16.2% 10.2% 13.4% 13.9% 15.2% 19 12 16 16 18
1.0 to 1.5 4.4% 8.6% 6.5% 11.5% 12.7% 4 8 6 10 11
Above 1.5 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% _ _ 1 1 1 _ _
Nonintegrated mills
Under 0.1 9.8% 8.1% 10.2% 9.2% 8.6% 255 227 255 221 213
0.1 to 0.2 6.8% 5.5% 6.3% 5.7% 6.1% 47 42 45 38 45
0.2 to 0.3 2.0% 1.6% 2.6% 1.7% 2.2% 8 7 11 7 10
0.3 to 0.4 0.6% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 2.3% 2 1 1 1 7
0.4 to 0.5 1.0% _ 0.5% _ _ 2 _ 1 _ _
0.5 to 0.75 1.1% 1.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 2 3 1 1 1
0.75 to 1.0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1.0 to 1.5 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Above 1.5 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(% of total paper capacity)
Sources: Post's Pulp and Paper Directory (1976,1981,1986); Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Paper and Allied Trades (1991,1996)
Percent of industry capacity Number of mills
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Table 2.7 – Entry and exit of integrated mills versus specialized mills each period 
 
Period Total new Integrated Paper only Pulp only
1975-1980 96 42 42 12
1980-1985 32 11 17 4
1985-1990 47 23 22 2
1990-1995 34 9 19 6
Period Total exit Integrated Paper only Pulp only
1975-1980 64 18 45 1
1980-1985 77 35 39 3
1985-1990 94 32 57 5
1990-1995 40 16 21 3
Sources: Post's Pulp and Paper Directory (1976,1981,1986); Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Paper 
and Allied Trades (1991, 1996).
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Table 2.8 – Integrated mills: entrants and established mills each decade, by region 
 
Period and Region Integrated entrants Integrated established mills




North Central 52.0% 54.0%
South 63.0% 76.0%




North Central 43.0% 38.0%
South 45.0% 72.0%




North Central 60.0% 40.0%
South 69.0% 72.0%




North Central 33.0% 44.0%
South 20.0% 69.0%
W est 50.0% 56.0%
Sources: Post's Pulp and Paper Directory (1976,1981,1986); Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Paper 
and Allied Trades (1991, 1996).  
 
Table 2.9 – Paper mills survival 
 
Type Number of mills
listed in 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Integrated 230 224 183 159 150
Survival Rate
1 97% 80% 69% 65%
Paper Only 354 215 199 155 140
Survival Rate
1 61% 56% 44% 40%
 
Sources: Post's Pulp and Paper Directory (1976,1981,1986); Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Paper 
and Allied Trades (1991, 1996).
1 Reported as a percentage of the original number of firms listed in 1975.
Number of mills that continued to be listed in:
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Table 2.10 – Paper mills switching between integration and specialization 
 





Note: Seventeen of the mills that integrated in the 1st period disintegrated in the 2nd period, one  of the 
mills that integrated in the 1st period disintegrated in the 3rd period, and another disintegrated in the 4th 
period. Two of the mills that integrated in the 2nd period disintegrated again, one in the 3rd period and the 
other in the 4th. Two mills integrated in the 3rd period and returned to disintegration in the 4th period. Four 
mills that disintegrated in the 1st period integrated back, two in the 2nd period, one in the 3rd, and one in 
the 4th. One mill that disintegrated in the 2nd period integrated back in the following period. Finally, two 
mills that disintegrated in the 2nd period, integrated in the 3rd period and disintegrated again in the 4th 
period.
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Table 2.11 – Concentration in the pulp and paper industry, 1975-1995, by region 
 
Year and Region Herfindahl Indices Herfindahl Indices
for the paper market for the pulp market
1975
Northeast 0.012 0.149




















North Central 0.014 0.141
South 0.013 0.036
West 0.034 0.071
Sources: Post's Pulp and Paper Directory (1976,1981,1986); Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Paper 
and Allied Trades (1991, 1996).
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dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
MODEL I
Constant -3.133 _ -2.964 _ -4.218 _ -3.667 _ -3.319 _
t-statistic -8.425 -9.089 -9.474 -9.025 -7.991
SIZE 0.722 0.288 0.654 0.258 0.873 0.343 0.734 0.293 0.719 0.287
t-statistic 10.484 10.812 11.242 10.530 10.106
NEW SPRINT DUMMY* 0.173 0.069 1.330 0.386 1.446 0.483 0.916 0.331 1.344 0.434
t-statistic 0.413 2.061 2.103 2.042 2.159
FORESTLAND DUMMY* 0.476 0.188 0.379 0.147 0.241 0.095 0.334 0.133 0.086 0.034
t-statistic 3.264 2.756 1.603 2.277 0.548
CONCENTRATION MEASURE I -1.159 -0.463 -0.703 -0.277 -0.972 -0.382 -3.667 -0.278 -1.131 -0.451
t-statistic -5.051 -3.418 -3.997 -9.025 -4.592
Number of observations 505 568 549 500 471
Log likelihood function -227.27 -272.91 -220.26 -220.05 -204.32
LR (chi^2 = 4) 245.09 240.21 312.84 251.90 242.98
M ODEL II
           
Constant -3.625 -3.379 -4.937 -4.141 -4.050
t-statistic -11.365 -11.164 -12.054 -11.339 -10.818
SIZE 0.731 0.291 0.644 0.253 0.862 0.340 0.723 0.289 0.692
t-statistic 10.689 10.631 11.176 10.434 9.917
NEW SPRINT DUMMY* 0.061 0.024 1.288 0.376 1.435 0.476 0.942 0.337 1.496
t-statistic 0.153 2.052 2.243 2.167 2.539
FORESTLAND DUMMY* 0.303 0.120 0.285 0.111 0.123 0.049 0.181 0.072 0.005
t-statistic 1.832 1.754 0.721 1.116 0.031
CONCENTRATION MEASURE II 0.002 0.001 0.0027 0.0011 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003
t-statistic 2.049 2.000 3.046 2.535 2.988
Number of observations 505 568 549 500 471
Log likelihood function -238.40 -276.63 -223.16 -221.11 -210.13
LR (chi^2 = 4) 222.84 232.77 307.05 249.77 231.36
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Table 3.2 – Panel analysis 
 
P ooled R andom P ooled R and om P ooled R andom P ooled R andom
p robit effects prob it effects p robit effects p robit effects
prob it p robit prob it prob it
D ata A ll A ll A ll A ll A ll A ll A ll A ll
D ependent variable V I V I V I V I V I V I V I V I
C onstant -3,302 -5,721 -3,977 -6,718 -3,934 -6,582 -3,270 -5,566
t-statistic -19,312 -10,517 -25,53 -12,678 -25,166 -12,758 -12,494 -9,269
SIZ E 0,713 1,226 0,706 1,189 0,698 1,160 0,697 1,193
t-statistic 23,661 11,906 23,763 11,814 23,415 11,893 23,066 12,426
N E W S 0,944 1,279 0,957 1,209 0,953 1,170 1,029 1,335
t-statistic 4,214 2,052 4,513 2,291 4,469 2,420 4,672 3,420
SW 0,294 0,766 0,259 0,922 0,186 0,807 0,087 0,548
t-statistic 4,549 3,704 3,697 4,221 4,469 3,605 1,154 3,420
C oncentration M easure -0,980 -1,702 0,0002 0,0001 0,003 0,004 0,002 0,003
t-statistic -9,803 -7,448 4,529 1,598 5,559 3,150 4,500 2,226
L agged C oncentration M easure 1,31E -08 2,08E -08 1,54E -08 2,37E -08 1,59E -08 2,32E -08
t-statistic 1,914 2,081 2,077 2,205 2,149 2,172
R uralness M easure 0,925 1,636
t-statistic 4,448 3,326
Personal Incom e (per cápita) -0,0002 -0,0003
t-statistic -4,331 -4,224
N um ber of groups 643 643 643 643
N um ber of observations 2593 2593 2593 2593 2593 2593 2593 2593
L og likelihood function -1164,36 -890,68 -1203,16 -921,81 -1195,62 -918,58 -1157,63 -897,64
chi
2 1262,01 210,11 1184,4 195,24 1195,41 202,04 1275,47 243,84
Pseudo R
2 0,35 0,33 0,33 0,36
C on cen tration  M easure III C oncentration M easure I C oncentration M easure II C on cen tration  M easure III
 Appendix – Tables and Figures    51 
 
 
Table 3.3 – Panel analysis, change data 
 
Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed
logit effects logit effects
logit logit








Mills that did not 
change status
Mills that did not 
change status
Mills that did not 
change status
Mills that did not 
change status
Dependent variable dVI dVI dVI dVI
Constant 0.081 0.046 -0.030 -0.058
t-statistic 5.991 1.865 -2.013 -2.026
Change in Concentration Measure I -0.216 0.001 -0.064 -0.039
t-statistic -1.095 0.049 -2.978 -1.202
Lagged Concentration Measure I 0.019 0.045 -0.032 -0.007
t-statistic 1.129 1.160 -1.724 -0.158
Dummy Variable for year 1985 -0.075 -0.046 -0.047 -0.025
t-statistic -5.585 -3.497 -3.203 -1.657
Dummy Variable for year 1990 -0.059 -0.042 0.027 0.038
t-statistic -4.370 -3.047 1.824 2.349
Dummy Variable for year 1995 -0.064 -0.038 0.016 0.031
t-statistic -4.790 -2.726 1.061 1.886
Number of groups 640 634
Number of observations 1849 1849 1868 1868
F  F(5, 1843) = 8,86 F(5, 1204) = 3,51 F(5,1862) = 8,83 F(5,1229) = 5,50
R squared 0.02 0.02
        




Table 5.1 – Parameter values used in simulation 
 
Average Cost Function Markov Process governing omega
A
N 0.0040 g g g g0 3.2789
A
I 0.0035 g g g g1 0.1343
h h h h
1 0.8160 m m m m 4.5952
h h h h
2 0.9274 s s s s
2 10.7774
a a a a 0.5101
l l l l0 15.4943 Cost to integrate - F 39.8800
l l l l1 1.2000
l l l l2 2 2 2 0.5000 Exit fee - F F F F 1636.2995
l l l l3 0.7000
l l l l4 15.0000
 









VI overall 0.936 0.245 0.000 1.000
between 0.186 0.000 1.000
within 0.197 0.136 1.736
w w w w overall 6.225 2.298 2.274 16.008
between 1.310 2.525 10.517
within 1.986 0.688 13.276
Wage overall 3.310 0.552 2.501 5.262
between 0.351 2.501 4.555
within 0.437 1.839 5.174
Concentration Measure I (HH index of 
the 200-mile diameter pulp market) overall 0.299 0.230 0.000 0.993
between 0.150 0.054 0.962
within 0.196 -0.238 1.047
Forestland Dummy (SW) overall 0.151 0.358 0.000 1.000
between 0.345 0.000 1.000
within 0.000 0.151 0.151
Asset Specificity Measure overall 0.384 0.253 0.000 1.000
between 0.187 0.022 0.925
within 0.179 -0.210 1.020
Number of Observations 1929
Number of groups 500
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mills All active mills
1 438 62 500
2 417 20 437
3 364 16 380
4 314 14 328








1 a 2 63 40 8
2 a 3 57 13 11
3 a 4 52 12 12
4 a 5 44 9 11
Mills active over the 
whole period 284
Number of mills 500
Number of Observations 2145
 




Table 5.4 – Reduced form model using simulated data 
 
Pooled Pooled Random Random Random Random Fixed Fixed
probit probit effects effects effects effects effects effects
probit probit logit logit logit logit
Data
Dependent variable VI VI VI VI VI VI VI VI
Constant 1.503 -7.336 1.736 -12.516 3.130 -22.829
t-statistic 13.025 -10.490 10.941 -3.912 9.834 -3.610
Concentration Measure I -0.514 1.869 -0.609 2.963 -1.184 5.354 -1.640 5.902
t-statistic -2.666 5.013 -2.751 3.332 -2.753 3.172 -3.053 1.799
Forestland Dummy 0.237 0.739 0.290 1.446 0.562 2.627
t-statistic 1.642 2.778 1.564 2.300 1.492 2.184
Asset Specificity Measure 0.426 1.219 0.455 1.826 0.936 3.307 0.628 30.373
t-statistic 2.235 3.662 2.034 2.731 2.083 2.622 1.071 1.088
Unobserved Productivity Index 1.993 3.450 6.310 8.127
t-statistic 11.685 3.915 3.622 2.533
Number of groups 500 500 500 500 91 91
Number of observations 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 406 406
Log likelihood function -451.00 -176.85 -444.60 -170.37 -444.65 -170.31 -137.25 -6.01
LR (chi^2 ) 18.48 566.78 12.45 275.27
Wald (chi^2) 16.9 15.75 17.13 13.58
Seudo R squared 0.02 0.62
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Figure 6.1 – Exit and integration cut-off values of w w w w 
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Figure 6.2 – Drawing sequences of w w w w’s from a truncated normal distribution 
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Table 6.2 – Parameter estimates 
(t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
Average Cost Function Markov Process governing omega
A
N 0.0040 g g g g0 3.2789
(108.806) (13.875)
A
I 0.0035 g g g g1 0.1343
(104.626) (2.552)
h h h h
1 0.8160 m m m m 4.5952
(350.6601) (28.421)
h h h h
2 0.9274 s s s s
2 10.7774
(366.680) (1.204)
a a a a 0.5101
(4.931)
l l l l0 15.4943 Cost to integrate - F 39.8800
(316.455) (4.912005)
l l l l1 0.0021




Figure 6.2 – Estimated f(w w w w) 
omega (w w w w)
f(omega)
Nonintegrated Mill Integrated Mill
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Unobserved Productivity Index w w w
Constant 3.896 3.833 3.486
t-statistic 349.539 267.496 202.839
Integration Status Dummy 2.600 2.749 3.452
t-statistic 161.785 139.002 103.733
Number of groups 642 642




































Productivity Change -26.572 -46.035
(t-statistic) (-8.450) (-7.403)
# Observations 1479 1479
Log Likelihood -55.2 -56.0
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Table 6.5 – Partial correlations 
 
Partial Correlation of unobserved mill productivity (w w w w) with:
Variable: Correlation
Size (log of capacity) 0.464
Concentration Measure I (mill specific HH index for the 200-miles diameter 
market) -0.121
Lagged Concentration Measure I (mill specific HH index for the 200-miles 
diameter market) -0.077































1980-1985 1.97% 2.44% 7.59% 177.33 448.93
1985-1990 -5.80% -7.09% -2.83% 428.94 490.69
1990-1995 6.59% 6.90% 5.57% 509.63 520.34
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